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IN THE SUPRE11E COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

DONALD A. DYSON, STEPHEN F.
KESLER, W.T. BISSELL, RONALD
McCLAIN, DONALD L. OBORN, and
ELMO WALKER,
Plaintiffs, (Donald A.
Dyson, Appellant),
vs.

Case No. 15661

AVIATION OFFICE OF AMERICA,
INCORPORATED, a Texas corporation, and RANGER INSURANCE COMPANY, a New York corporation and KENNETH R. SHANNON,
Defendants/Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS A.O.A. AND
RANGER INSURANCE COMPANY
NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was originally commenced by Dyson, Kesler,
Bissell, McClain, Oborn, and Walker against Aviation Office
of America

(A.O.A.), Ranger Insurance Company,

Kenneth R. Shannon.

(Ranger) and

Plaintiffs (owners of plane) claimed a

breach of contract by the insurance company (Ranger) and its
underwriting group (A.O.A.) alleging that the company failed to
properly issue an insurance policy covering the loss to a Cessna airplane.

(R., pp. 2-5).

Plaintiffs' claim against Shannon
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was for negligence in crashing the airplane.

(R.

I

pp. 6-7).

A third-party complaint was filed by A.O.A. and Ranger
against Plaintiff, Dyson, an insurance agent, and his insurance
agency alleging that Dyson and his agency indemnify the company
for any money paid to the plaintiffs caused by Dyson's negligence, breach of duty, or intentional misrepresentation of
facts.

(R., pp. 18-21).

Dyson and his agency counterclaimed against Ranger and
A.O.A. alleging that they had impliedly provided coverage to
the plaintiffs and had also committed negligence in failing to
advise Dyson that no coverage was provided.

(R.

I

pp. 72-76).

Finally, Plaintiffs, Kesler, Bissell, McClain, Oborn,
and Walker filed a cross-claim and third-party complaint
against Dyson and his agency alleging that Dyson had breached

(R.,

his contract to obtain insurance for the other plaintiffs.
pp. 54-57).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court, sitting without a jury, found in favor
of A.O.A. and Ranger and against the plaintiffs, no cause of
action, on the complaint.

However, it did enter judgment in

favor of the other plaintiffs against Dyson on their crossclaim and third-party complaint in the amount of $27,000.

Fin-

ally, the trial court entered judgment, no cause of action, in
favor of A.O.A. and Ranger against Dyson and his agency on the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
(R., pp. 284Dyson
cross-claim
against the insurance carrier.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents A.O.A. and Ranger Insurance Company seek affirmance of the lower court's decision as to all parties on
all causes.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Judge Croft, wrote an extensive memorandum opinion concerning this litigation.

(R., pp. 249-269}.

This opinion is

attached for this Court's convenience hereto as an Appendix.
While these respondents do not disagree with the majority of
the statement of facts as set forth in Appellants' brief, there
have been many important facts and items of testimony omitted
from Appellants' Statement.

Rather than supplementing Appel-

lants' Statement of Facts at this juncture, these Respor.dents
shall rely upon abstracted portions of the Statement of Facts
made by Judge Croft in his Memorandum Opinion with appropriate
references to the record added in support thereof.

In addition,

further facts and testimony of the witnesses shall be discussed
in detail in the various sub-parts of the argument portion of
this brief.
The following is the pertinent portion of Judge Croft's
Memorandum decision relating to the factual background:

(R.,

pp. 253-260; App., pp. A-6- A-17}.
"In this memorandum I shall not undertake to summarize the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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testimony of the respective witnesses as called, but rather
will summarize what I consider to be the material and relevant
facts as established by the evidence.
"AOA underwrites aviation insurance for Ranger and other
insurance companies, and as such has agency contracts with some
5, 000 agents throughout the country, only six of whom have writ·
ten authority to bind AOA and its insurers on aviation policies
without the prior approval of AOA.

(Tr., p. 643).

On February

14, 1968, Ranger through AOA executed an agency agreement with
LeRoy and Donald Dyson, dba L.F. Dyson and Associates by which
the Dysons were appointed "agent" of Ranger for aviation hazards only.

(Tr., p. 374; Ex. 2D).

The agreement, among other

things, contained the following provision:
"Nothing herein shall be construed as authorizing the agent to commit or bind the
company to any liability without the prior
approval of Aviation Office of America, Inc."
(Ex. 2D).
"The agency agreement remained in force throughout the
period relating to this case.

On December 30, 1974, Ranger

through AOA entered into an agency agreement with Aviation General Agency (hereinafter called AGA) of Cody, Wyoming, appointing AGA as an agent with authority to bind AOA and represented
insurance companies on •business and pleasure' risks, but with
no authority to bind on 'limited commercial' risks, within the
stated limits of coverage.

Dyson was advised of the availa-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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bility of AGA as an agency authorized to act for AOA.

(Tr.,

pp. 3 3 6, 57 3-5 7 4) .
"In March, 1975, Dyson, Kesler, Bissell, McClain, and
Oborn orally agreed to purchase the Cessna plane in question
as equal partners for $27,000.

(Tr., p. 765).

They borrowed

the full amount of the purchase price from Walker Bank & Trust
Company on March 18, 1975, and jointly signed a promissory note,
on which they each became jointly and severally liable, for the
face amount of $38,519.88

(Interest rate of 10.58%) payable in

84 successive monthly installments of $458.57 each commencing
April 2 5, 19 7 5.

(Ex. 36P).

agreement on the plane.

The note was secured by a security

At the time of the transaction Walker

Bank stated that the plane must be fully insured.

361, 382, 766-767).

(Tr., pp.

Donald Dyson agreed with his other four

partners that he would take care of obtaining the required insurance coverage on the plane, it being known by his said four
partners that he was then in the insurance business as an insurance agent, and he then knew that they were relying upon him
to do so.

At the trial the Dysons acknowledged that Donald Dy-

son had a duty to obtain the required insurance coverage.

pp. 346-347, 355, 767).

(Tr.,

At this time only Donald Dyson was a

licensed pilot and it was the intent of the other four partners
to learn to fly the plane and to be licensed therefor.

(Tr.,

pp. 383, 768-769).
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tion' for aircraft insurance on an AOA form, requesting insurance on the Cessna plane with a liability coverage of
$27,000 on the plane for all risks while in motion.
384; Ex. 4DD).

(Tr., p.

The application showed only Donald A. Dyson

as the insured, marking it as an 'individual' ownership rather
than a 'partnership' ownership.

In Section 7 of the applica-

tion it named Donald A. Dyson and Jim Breeze, an FAA Examiner,
as pilots with 'additional pilots to be added as they qualify'.

Walker Bank was shown as mortgagee.

(Ex. 4DD).

"On March 22, 1975, Mary Jane Cartwright, an employee of
Dyson, forwarded the written application to 'Aviation Office
of America, P.O. Box 7, Cody, Wyoming,' which was the address
of AGA.

It stated that an application 'to be effective 3/21/75

covering a 1968 Cessna for Donald A. Dyson' was enclosed, requesting a policy at the earliest convenience, stating the
purpose was 'pleasure' and suggesting language for the pilot
clause.

(Ex. 23DA).

"On March 26, 1975, AGA issued binder 1020 confirming it
had bound with AOA insurance coverage on the plane for 30 days
effective March 26, 1975.

(Tr., p. 628; Ex. 24DA).

Based upon

said application, policy No. AC Al-198882 was issued by Ranger
to Donald Dyson as the named insured, under date of April 1,
1975, and effective from March 26, 1975 to March 26, 1976.
3DA).

(Ex.

The total premium was stated as $748.00 with $400.00

thereof
being
charged
for for
the
$27,000
for
all Services
risks
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while in motion.

(Ex. 3DA; Ex. 5DD).

The pilot clause pro-

vided that 'Only the following pilot or pilots holding valid
and effective pilot and medical certificates with ratings as
required by FAA for the flight involved will fly the craft'.

(Ex. 3DA).

Then followed the names Donald A. Dyson or Jim

Breeze (together with private or commercial pilots with a minimum number of logged hours which phrase admittedly did not cover any of the parties here involved) •

(Ex. 3DA).

"The policy contained a provision in paragraph 19 thereof
which provided as follows:

' . • • nor shall the terms of this

policy be waived or changed, except by improved (sic) endorsement issued to form a part of this policy, signed by the authorized company representative'.

(Ex. 3DA).

"In April, 1975, the premium due on the policy was billed
to L.F. Dyson and Associates by AGA.

(Ex. 5DD).

"Mary Jane Cartwright handled the processing of insurance
for the Dyson agency and Donald Dyson had nothing to do with
contacting AOA or Ranger on the policy.

(Tr., p. 384).

"The first steps to effecting a change in the policy occurred on July 21, 1975, when a request was made of AGA by Cartwright to add plaintiff Kesler as a pilot to be covered.
pp. 628, 671).

(Tr.,

Cartwright did not recall how her contact with

AGA was made to initiate this change (Tr., pp. 428-429) but on
that date AGA through David Brannon sent a handwritten communiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and stating effective '7-22', AOA was to change use to include rental and also adding Stephen Kesler as a named pilot
and stating liability premium was increased $21.00 and the Hull
coverage by $203.00.

(Ex. 7DD).

"Also on July 21, 1975, Cartwright typed a written note
to Dave Brannon in Cody saying, 'Sorry--change signals again'
and telling him to delete the earlier request to cover rental
of the plane commercially.

(Ex. 8DD).

She then stated it was

necessary to change the pilot clause to include Kesler, stating some facts about his experience, saying the $21.00 increase
had been quoted to him and concluding by saying 'Please send us
an endorsement adding him as a pilot'.

(Ex.

BOD).

"By a memo dated August 20, 1975, from the AOA office in
Beaumont, Texas, to L.F. Dyson and Associates a request was
made to forward pilot information on Kesler as AOA needed to
know specific information 'before we can add as approved pilot'.
(Ex.

9DD).

"On August 26, 1975, Cartwright wrote Brannon at AGA in
Cody requesting addition of Tim Bissell as a pilot and also
stating therein that 'we had previously requested that you add
Stephen Kesler, however we have not received any confirmation
from you that these are being added.
note to that effect for our file.'

We would appreciate a
(Ex. 6DD).

This was received

in the AGA office on August 28, 1975, and on a copy thereof, unSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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der date of September 24, 1975, Sara Broughton of AOA in Texas
wrote 'before we can approve above pilot please have the attached pilot form completed by Tim Bissell.'

(Ex. 12DD).

"On September 9, 1975, Tom Dougherty made a written record of a telephone conversation he had with 'Dyson' requesting a change of use to limited commercial and to add two pilots,
Bissell and Kesler.

(Tr., pp. 588-589; Ex. 28DD).

"On September 17, 1975, the AOA office in Texas sent a
communication to L.F. Dyson and Associates requesting advice
as to Bissell's first name so he could be added as a named pilot and stating that an endorsement adding Kesler as pilot and
changing use to limited commercial was then being typed.
lODD).

(Ex.

That endorsement was issued, dated September 17, 1975,

showing Kesler as an added pilot and the purpose of use as
'limited commercial' with a total additional premium of $302.00
with the effective date of the endorsement being July 22, 1975,
which was the date, as noted above, that it had been agreed by
Dougherty (AOA) in his telephone communication with Brannon
(AGA) on July 21, 1975, would be the effective date for adding
coverage on Kesler as a pilot.

(Ex. llD).

"The requested pilot experience form, undated, was filled
out, signed by Bissell,

(Ex. 13DD) and submitted so that an en-

dorsement was issued December 2, 1975, by AOA for Ranger amending Item 7 of the policy to add 'Torn Bissell'.

(Ex. 14DD) •

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The effective date of this endorsement was November 13, 1975,
which was the date the pilot information sheet was forwarded
to AOA in Dallas by Cartwright on Bissell.
14DD).

(Tr., p. 583; Ex.

No additional premium was required on Bissell.

(Tr.,

p. 630).
"As noted supra, McClain had sold his interest to Walker
and Oborn had sold to Ferguson under a contract dated October
15, 1975, in which Ferguson agreed to pay Oborn's share of the
amount due Walker Bank.

(Tr., p. 395; Ex. lPP).

"After the contract of sale to Ferguson on November 5,
1975, Mary Jane Cartwright sent a memorandum to AOA, but addressed it to P.O. Box 7 in Cody, Wyoming, stating they had

another name to add to the policy - Gary Ferguson - and for thj
they needed additional pilot information forms to be completed
and requested a small supply for Dyson's use.

(Ex. 20DA).

Brannon at AGA replied to this by directing that they 'use Iterr
#7 of the regular application.'

(Ex. 22DA).

"On November 13, 1975, in Cartwright's memorandum to AOA

in Dallas enclosing Bissell's pilot information sheet (mentioned supra), she also requested more pilot information forms
'as we have another commercial pilot to be added to this policy'.

(Ex. 26DA).

"Thereafter, Mary Jane Cartwright forwarded on December 4,

1975, a memorandum to AOA in Dallas, Texas, enclosing a pilot's

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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statement on Ferguson, requested that Breeze be deleted, requested a confirming memo and stated that since Ferguson had
so many hours, it was doubtful the rate would be affected.
lSDD).

(Ex.

Under date of December 10, 1975, AOA issued an endorse-

ment effective December 4, 1975, amending Item 7 to show Bissell, Dyson, Kesler and Ferguson as the pilots covered.
16DD).

No change in premium resulted.

(Ex.

(Tr., p. 630).

"Also, about December 1, 1975, Dyson sold his interest
in the plane to Kenneth Richard Shannon on a contract under
which Shannon agreed to as'surne Dyson's obligation to Walker
Bank.

(Tr., pp. 396, 400).

Dyson's partners in the plane

voiced concern about Shannon's qualifications and ability, but
he made some inquiry, advised them he was licensed by FAA and
experienced and assured them they were protected in their investment by insurance coverage.

(Tr., pp. 400, 750).

However,

Dyson did not advise either AOA or AGA of the sale of his ownership interest to Shannon nor did he request any change in the
policy.

(Tr., p. 392).

He only told Mary Jane Cartwright to

take the necessary steps to get Shannon's name added to the policy as a pilot.

(Tr., p. 416).

Dyson did not tell Cartwright

to have his own name dropped as a pilot or as the insured nor
did he tell her he had sold his interest in the plane to Shannon.

(Tr., pp. 403, 416).

Dyson either gave Shannon a key to the

Plane or left it with Cartwright for Shannon to pick up (Tr.,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pp. 402, 554) although Cartwright had no recollection that
she received the key from Dyson or gave it to Shannon.

(Tr.,

p. 761).
"Thereafter, on December 8, 1975, Cartwright forwarded
an office memorandum to AOA in Dallas, Texas, enclosing a pilot experience form on Shannon stating he was to be included
as a pilot under the policy and requesting an endorsement to
this effect.

(Ex. 17DD).

This communication was received by

AOA in Dallas, and on December 15, 1975, Sara Broughton, an
employee of AOA whose underwriting duty it was to make changes
in existing policies, wrote in reply thereto the following:
"This risk has reached a flying club exposure. To add this pilot it will be a
fully earned premium of $100. Please advise
i f you want him added." (Ex. 34DA).
"In a deposition taken in Dallas, Texas on September 13,
1977, Sara Broughton testified she mailed this response to the
Dyson agency.

(Tr., p. 740).

Mary Jane Cartwright denied

ever seeing this response or having received it in the mail.
(Tr., p. 441).
it.

Dyson too denied ever having received or seeing

Thus, no further written communication was sent in response

thereto and no endorsement adding Shannon's name was ever issued by AOA.

(Tr., pp. 632, 634).

Cartwright testified that

in talking to Torn Dougherty in connection with a file on one
Don Rich on December 16, 1975, she asked him about the endorsement on Shannon, stating he said he would look into it.

(Tr.,
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p. 442).

Dougherty did not personally recall this telephone

conversation with Cartwright but did not deny having it as his
file on Rich contained notes of a telephone call from Cartwright
on December 16, 1975, but they contained no reference to Shannon.
(Tr., pp. 598-599, 635).

If Dougherty received this call and

did in fact look into it, a reasonable inference is that he
would have seen Broughton's reply of December 15, 1975, set out
above and may reasonably have assumed Cartwright would be receiving it shortly.

Cartwright also testified she recalled

asking Dougherty about the Shannon endorsement in talking to
him on a policy for one Dick Reynolds.

(Tr., p. 441).

However,

Dougherty's file on Reynolds shows his policy was not effective
until November 15, 1976, some 10-1/2 months after the plane
crashed on February 1, 1976.

(Tr., p. 635).

"The crash occurred on that date with Shannon at the controls and flying it.
tally wrecked.

(Ex. 18DD).

As noted, the plane was to-

A notation on a claim form dated February 2,

1976, indicated the accident occurred because while landing, the
runway was missed, and the plane hit power lines and crashed.

(Ex. 18DD).

It appears Shannon's wife and two children were in-

jured in the crash and hospitalized as a result thereof.

(Ex.

l8DD) .
"On February 15, 1976, Cartwright wrote a letter to Dougherty at AOA enclosing a copy of the Dyson memo 'dated December
7, 197
5' (actually dated December 8) wherein 'we requested that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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you add Kennet!:J. Sh.ar.ncn as a :::i.lc-: -:c
licy in the name o=

~r.

:.::.e

a:::c·:e ca:;::..:.c:-.e::. :;:c-

Dyson.'

"She further stated:
ing memo or endorsement to the :::o.:.ic·:.
iie ·..·c·..:.:.:=. a:;:;::re-

sold his interest in the craft to :·!r. Sha."l!".o:-..

ciate an endorsement at your earliest convenience',

addin~

a

postscript 'Perhaps this request !l.i-: your of=.:.ce ·..-:::en :.,.·o;.: ·,.;ere
in the process of moving and thus t!l.e dela::·.
ciate the endorsement.'

~,·e

·..;cu.:.:: ap:;:re-

(Ex. 19DD).

•The move by AOA from Beaumont to Dallas :::ad in =ac:.
made in the summer of 1975.

:::ea~

(Tr. , p. 6 2 5) •

"Dougherty replied on March 1, 1976, noting that

·~e

guo-

ted the amount of premium required to add pilot but did not
receive a response'.

(Ex. 30).

He also said it was not cus-

tomery (sic) to assign policies and advance approval of the
company would be needed.

(Ex. 30).

Dougherty's files also

contained notations dated March 1, 1976 of a telephone call
with Tom Lehman (manager) General Adjustment Bureau, Albuquerque, New Mexico)

(sic) in which he recorded that they did not

add the pilot because they had 'no reply to Sara B's 12/15 memo'.

(Ex. 31).
"It was stipulated that the proof of loss or claim re-

quired under the policy had been duly filed.

(Tr., p. 756; Ex.

37).
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Lehman advised that he regretted to advise him that there was
no coverage under the policy for the claims arising out of
the accident as Shannon was not a named pilot under the terms
of the policy nor did he qualify under the open pilot endorsement.

(Ex. 38).

It further stated that Dyson had warranted

under the application for aircraft insurance that he was the
sole owner, but that the records of the FAA and their own further investigation indicated this information was incorrect.
(Ex.38)."

Based upon these findings a judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff owners against Dyson personally and against
the L.F. Dyson Agency in the amount of $27,000.

The Court ruled

against Plaintiffs' claim towards A.O.A. and Ranger, gave judgment in favor of A.O.A. and Ranger against Dyson, and ruled
against Dyson and the agency as to all claims.

286).

(R.

I

pp. 284-

It is from this judgment that this appeal is taken.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DYSON AGENCY WAS LIMITED BY THE CLEAR
TERMS OF THE AGENCY AGREEMENT WITH RANGER
INSURANCE COMPANY AND CANNOT CLAIM IT HAD
EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED BINDING AUTHORITY TO INSURE SHANNON.

A.
It is Undisputed That Shannon was Never Expressly
Covered Under the Airplane Policy.
The Ranger Insurance policy issued in March of 1975 did
3DA).
notSponsored
include
R. Funding
Shannon
as provided
a named
pilot.
by the S.J.Kenneth
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for digitization
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of Museum (Ex.
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Shannon did not qualify under the open-pilot provision in the
policy since he did not have 100 hours in multi-engine aircraft nor 10 hours in the insured aircraft.

(Ex.

3DA; 17DD).

The trial court found that it was "appaient that no written
endorsement approving the addition of the name of Shannon as
a pilot to Item 7 of the policy was ever issued."
App., p. A-17).

(R., p. 260;

The last endorsement to the policy dated De-

cember 4, 1975 named Tom Bissell, Donald A. Dyson, Stephen
Kesler, or Gary Ferguson as pilots (Ex. 16DD).

Shannon was

never listed as a pilot in any subsequent endorsements.
It is undisputed that the Dyson Agency never requested an
(Tr., p. 475).

oral binder to cover Shannon.

The only means

of requesting coverage was done through the memo dated December 8, 1975 enclosing a pilot experience form for Shannon and
requesting his endorsement as a pilot.

(Ex. 17DD).

While Dy-

son claimed he never received a reply to his December 8 request,
the files of the insurance company show that a reply was made
on December 15, 1975 by Sara Broughton, an underwriter for A.O.A.
stating the following:
This risk has reached a flying club exposure. To add this pilot it will be a fullyearned premium of $100. Please advise if
you want him added.
(Ex. 34DA).
Thus, the last known communication from the company requested
Dyson to give his approval as to the new status of the policy
and to the additional premium.

There was clearly no express
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acceptance of Shannon as a risk and this fact would not have
changed even if Dyson admitted receiving the reply message.
For these reasons, if Dyson is to recover in this lawsuit
he must show coverage by implication rather than by express
agreement.

The trial court correctly held that such a showing

was not made.
B.
The Dyson Agency Did Not Have Express Nor Implied
Authority to Bind the Company to Insure Shannon.
The agency agreement entered into between Ranger Insurance
Company and the L.F. Dyson and Associates Agency dated February

14, 1968 specifically stated the following:
Nothing herein shall be construed as authorizing the agent to commit or bind the
company to any liability without the prior
approval of Aviation Office of America,
Inc.
(Ex. 2DD) •
The language contained in the agency agreement is clear
and unambiguous.

The terms clearly state that Dyson has no au-

thority to bind any risk without the express approval of A.O.A.
Dyson admitted that he was not aware of any written or
oral agreement from Ranger Insurance Company altering this express limitation in the agency contract.

( Tr • , pp • 3 8 5-3 8 6 l •

Similarly, Mrs. Cartwright of the Dyson Agency stated that
she always assumed it was necessary for A.O.A. or A.G.A. to approve a risk and that she never assumed that she could do this
herself.

(Tr., p. 44).

She also believed that A.O.A. could

always reject an application if it did not wish to assume the
risk.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that as a regular procedure in almost all instances when there
was going to be a material change in a risk on a policy she
would call A.O.A. and obtain an oral binder and then follow up
that conversation with a memorandum.

(Tr., p. 497).

Thus, Dyson and his chief employee at the time of the
coverage in question both admitted that they never considered
themselves to have the power to bind the company but always
sought specific approval as provided in the agency agreement.
Dyson attempts to circumvent the failure to have either an
express endorsement of Shannon by the company or an express
authorization to bind the company by claiming that the company
impliedly gave Dyson binding authority because of its alleged
practice of backdating policies.
Dyson, in his brief makes the following statement:
As an abstract principle, respondents do not
seriously contend the proposition that if an
insurance company adopts the practice of
backdating endorsements for additional insurance coverage to the dates that the soliciting agents requested the coverages, that
the company has in fact impliedly extended
binding authority to the agent.
Rather, respondents deny that they adopted such a practice.
(Appellants' brief, p. lll.
This statement purporting to present Respondents' position
in this case is grossly erroneous.

It is difficult to imagine

how Appellants could make such a statement in light of Respondents' consistent position throughout the trial court proceedings.
Respondents
have
always
contended
that
course
ofServices
conduct
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cannot alter an unambiguous express agreement.
375-3771 458-459,

(Tr., pp.

683-684!.

Respondents argued throughout the trial that (1) course
of conduct and custom cannot vary an unambiguous agency contract, and (2) there was no evidence showing a course of conduct existed between Dyson and Ranger Insurance Company which
would have in any way affected the policy in this case.

This

second argument will be discussed in detail in Point II of this
brief infra.
The law is overwhelmingly consistent that custom, usage,
or course of conduct cannot be used to vary the terms of an
express agreement unless the terms of the agreement are unarnbiguous

an~

subject to interpretation.

A brief review of the authorities will illustrate this
point.

The rule as to the liability of an insurance agent to

his company for issuance of a policy beyond his express authority is as follows:
Where the instructions are clear, precise,
and imperative, they should be followed
strictly and exactly, and a violation of
definite instructions cannot be excused by
a custom or a usage in the business. More
specifically, an insurance agent should
confine his acts to the scope of his actual
authority, and although he may, within his
apparent or ostensible authority, bind the
insurer to risks which his instructions
forbid him to assume, he is liable to the
company if he issues a policy in violation
of his instructions and thereby subjects
the company to a liability which it has forhim
toFunding
assume
forprovided
it. by the
Annot.
"LiaSponsored by thebidden
S.J. Quinney Law
Library.
for digitization
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bility of Insurance Agent, for Exposure
of Insurer to Liability, Because of Issuance of Policy Beyond Authority or Contrary to Instructions," 35 A.L.R.3d 907,
912 (Emphasis added) .
Another leading authority has stated the rule regarding
custom as follows:
It has been held that the courts should
not resort too freely to custom or usage
to control the true intention of the parties, and such evidence is not admissible
to vary the terms of an unambiguous contract, nor is it admissible where the terms
of the contract exclude the usage . • • .
The true test of admissibility is whether
there is in the contract something doubtful which can be explained by usage, and,
if the contract is plain and unambiguous,
evidence of custom is inadmissible to vary
or contradict it.

*

*

*

Further, evidence of a usage is not admissible where an agent's, factor's or broker's contract is clear and unambiguous as
to his duties or his compensation, and so,
where a principal has given express instructions, usage will not justify or excuse a
departure therefrom.
25 C.J.S., Customs
and Usages, Sections 21-30.
(Emphasis added).
Utah statutory law follows this rule.

Section 70A-l-205,

U.C.A. states the following:
The express terms of an agreement and an
applicable course of dealing or usage of
trade shall be construed whenever reasonable
as consistent with each other; but when such
construction is unreasonable express terms
control both course of dealing and usage of
trade.
(Emphasis added).
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This Court in Barnett v. State Automobile and Casualty
Underwriters, 487 P.2d 311 (Utah 1971) also recognized this
principle and quoted numerous authorities holding that trade
custom or usage is not admissible where there is no ambiguity
in the contract.

This Court concluded that an insurance con-

tract expiration date was clear and unambiguous and that it
was error to instruct that custom of the agency could vary the
date.
In Barnett the action was between an insured and the insurance company; the effect of the decision was to deny any
coverage to the insured because of his reliance upon the custom and usage of his agent.

In this case, however, the insured

plaintiffs admit to not having relied upon any course of conduct with Ranger.

(Tr., pp. 357-358).

Besides, they have

been given full judgment against Dyson on the basis of Dyson's
failure to provide insurance coverage.

Therefore, the instant

case does not involve the equities and hardships found in Barnett since the agreement being litigated is that between the
insurance company and its own agent.

Certainly, an agent should

be bound by the express terms of his agency contract if an insured, as in Barnett, is held to the terms of the insurance contract even though the insured's reliance on his agent caused
him to suffer a loss.
This Court in Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk, 321 P.2d
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221 lUtah 1958) stated the following rule for interpretation
of contracts:
Unless there is ambiguity or uncertainty
in the language so that the meani~g is
confused, or is susceptible of more than
one meaning, there is no justification
for interpretation or explanation from extraneous sources.
It would defeat the
very purpose of formal contracts to permit a party to invoke the use of words or
conduct inconsistent with its terms to
prove that the parties did not mean what
they said, or to use such inconsistent
words or conduct to demonstrate uncertainty or ambiguity where none would otherwise
exist. Id. at 223.
See also Mason v. Tooele City, 484 P.2d 153

(Utah 1971); Martin

v. Christensen, 454 P.2d 294 (Utah 1969); and Pulsipher v.
Tolboe, 370 P.2d 360 (Utah 1962).
Courts in every jurisdiction recognize the rule that custom, usage, and course of dealings cannot vary the terms of an
express agreement.

See Corbin-Dykes Electric Company v. Burr,

500 P.2d 632 (Ariz. 1972); Williams v. Elliott, 273 P.2d 953
(Cal. 1954); Bassett Construction Co. v. Schmitz Painting Contractors, 533 P.2d 503 (Colo. 1975); Puget Sound National Bank

v. C.B. Lauch Construction Company, 245 P.2d 800 (Ida. 1952);
Rachou v. McQuitty, 229 P.2d 965 (Mont. 1951); Asbury Transportation v. Consolidated Freightways Corporation, 501 P.2d 321
(Or. 1972); and S.L. Rowland Construction Company v. Beall Pipe
and Tank Corporation, 540 P.2d 912

(Wash. 1975).

In this case Dyson claims that the company consistently
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l

"backdated" insurance policies to the date of application rather than the date of acceptance and that this alleged practice
therefore impliedly gave Dyson binding authority from the time
of application to the time of acceptance or rejection of the
risk by the company.

This argument, of course, flies directly

in conflict with the express provision in the agency agreement
stating that Dyson had no binding authority.

Thus, Dyson's

position is directly contradicted by all legal authorities ineluding numerous decisions from this Court.
It should be noted at this point, that this is not a case
where a policy date is in question such as where a loss occurred
prior to the acceptance of the risk by the company.

In this

case there was never an acceptance of the risk by the company
at any time.

Dyson is therefore attempting to impute binding

authority on the insurance agency in order that the company
which never accepted the risk will be responsible for the darnage.
C.
The Traveler's Case Relied Upon by Appellants is Distinguishable As To Its Facts From the Instant Case.
Dyson's only authority for his unorthodox position is the
New Jersey Traveler's Insurance Company case cited extensively
in Appellants' brief.

(Appellants' brief, pp. 11-16).

This

case, however, is not only directly contrary to the numerous
authorities cited above including this Court's own decisions but
is clearly distinguishable upon its facts.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1968) is the only case cited by Appellants both at the time of
trial and in this Court standing for the proposition that as
between an insurance agent and his company the agency agreement may not always be controlling.

Respondents believe that

this is the only case in the nation in which the clear rule that
conduct cannot alter the express terms of a contract is not
scrupulously adhered to.
Respondents have no quarrel with the holding in Traveler's
based upon its own facts since the facts in the Traveler's
case are dramatically different from the facts in the instant
case and, for this reason, the case is not persuasive even as
a minority position.
The Traveler's case involved an action by an insured who
sued both his insurance agent and Traveler's Insurance Company.
The agent had expressly given the insured an oral binder of coverage before the loss occurred.

The court awarded a judgment

to the plaintiff against Traveler's on the basis that the agent
had apparent authority to act for Traveler's and that the insured justifiably relied upon the agent's representation.
The trial court ruled in favor of Traveler's against the
agent holding that the agent acted without actual authority to
bind the company and therefore had to indemnify Traveler's for
the amount of the loss paid to the insured.

The Appellate

Court reversed.
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The following is an analysis of the New Jersey Court's
opinion in the Traveler's Case as contrasted with the facts
in the instant case.

The Traveler's case is distinguishable

from the instant case in the following respects:
1.

In Traveler's the agent alleged that a letter

he had received from the company stating the company would furnish him with necessary binding authority expressly modified
the contract provision.

In this case, Dyson denies that any

express binder or modification was ever communicated to him.
(Tr. , p.

3 6 8) •

2.

In Traveler's the agent testified that he was

led by the practice of backdating to believe that he was actually authorized to bind the risk while the company considered
the application and consequently he expressly gave an oral binder to the insured.
~ssued

~.ad

In this case, however, no binder was ever

by Dyson to the plaintiff nor did Dyson ever think he

bi.'1ding authority.

(Tr., pp. 385-386, 484-486).

In addi-

:1on, it was undisputed that while A.O.A. has 5,000 agents
:~~oughout
~::~

the country soliciting insurance,only six have bind-

authority.

( Tr . , p.

6 4 3) •

It was for this reason that the

::;sor. a:;er:cy ·,.;ould routine!:: call A.O .A. for an oral binder i f
~

::a:erial risk c:-.a.'1ge was occurring.
3.

The court

~'1

( Tr. , p. 4 9 7) •

Traveler's i.'nplied that the ex-

;:ess 3.',.1-:::crizat:..cr. :::..?e..--: ":o t.:-.e agent ·..;as ambiguous and that
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the agent had the authority to act in accordance "with W'hat
he reasonably believes to be the wish of the principal even
though it is contrary to the principal's actual intent."
A.2d at 8.

239

In this case, however, there was no finding nor

even a claim that Dyson's agency agreement was ambiguous or
that subsequent writings had in any way modified the original
agreement.

Dyson agreed that the agreement was not ambiguous.

(Tr., p. 385).
4.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey was concerned

with the practice of Traveler's Insurance in accepting a premium for a backdated policy from the time of the backdating
even though the policy had been accepted by the company at a
later date.

The court stated:

[T]he application would hold the interim
risk if Traveler's should reject the application after a loss, while Traveler's, if
it issued the policy, would obtain a full
premium for the period during which it held
the option to accept or reject the application even though at the time of acceptance
Traveler's knew there had been no loss and
of course no risk.
Id. at 7.
In the instant case the evidence was consistent that any backdating only occurred when no additional premium was involved.
In other words, the company would backdate applications of additional pilots as long as no new risk requiring a greater premium was involved.

If, however, the risk increased then the

company required that the agent approve the increased premium
and did
issue
coverage
untilprovided
it received
the and
agent's
approSponsored
by the not
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for digitization
by the Institute of Museum
Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-26-

val.

(Tr., pp. 630-631; 704-707).

In other instances oral

binders were given and both coverage and premiums took effect.
Thus, unlike the Traveler's Insurance Company, Ranger Insurance did not "have its cake and eat it too" by charging an
insured a premium for a period of time which had already passed
at the time the risk was accepted.
5.

The Traveler's decision was based upon conduct

in which 300 identical cases of backdating new coverage were
accepted by the company without a single exception.

In the

instant case, Dyson failed to show a single instance where
Ranger backdated policies on new risks, let alone a "course

of conduct".

The proof relied upon by Dyson as to this issue

consists of approximately 10 transactions with Ranger Insurance Company but even those are clearly distinguishable.

They

consisted of renewals, renewal policies, new business policies,
~dorsements,

changing of aircraft, changing pilots, adding

pilots, and changing uses.

(Tr., p. 639).

These policies were

issued from the inception of the agency in 1968.

(Ex.

2DD).

Such a small number of divergent and differing types of coverage amply justifies the trial court's conclusion that "The
thread which Dysons seek to grasp to support their contention
that a course of dealing was established does not run through
the policy cases upon which evidence was given."
App., p. A-19).

(Tr., p. 261;

A more thorough examination of this evidence
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will be made in Point II of this brief infra.
6.

The court in Traveler's circumvented the express

agreement in the agency contract by stating that such agreement
could always be modified by conduct or a new understanding.
239 A.2d at 9.

While it is true that parties can always modi-

fy a written agreement as this Court has held in the cases cited
in Appellants' brief (Appellants' brief, pp. 18-19) the theory
of modification cannot apply in this case.

First, modification

has never been plead or raised by Appellants in the lower court
and under Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P. cannot now be raised.

Second,

and more importantly, Dyson himself admitted that there was
neither oral nor written communication from the company changing his binding authority.

(Tr., pp. 385-386).

Thus, the tra-

ditional express modification of a written agreement that is
found in those cases cited by Appellants does not exist in the
instant case nor was there a showing that any new consideration
was given for a modification.
It should also be noted that in Traveler's much of the
language and many of the authorities cited by the New Jersey
Supreme Court concerned cases involving apparent authority of
agents as affecting an insurance applicant.

The authorities

are uniform that an insurance company may be bound to insure an
applicant if its agent misleads the applicant into believing
that the agent has bound a risk.

The courts hold that under

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the

actions of its agent when it appears to innocent third parties
that the agent has the authority to bind the company, even if
the agent in fact does not.
This Court in numerous cases has held that the doctrine
of apparent or ostensible authority is applicable to third parties if the principal allows his agent to be placed in a position where the third party appears to have authority to act for
the principal.

Santi v. Denver & Rio Grande Railway, 442 P.2d

921 (Utah 1968); Malia v. Moulton, 114 P.2d 208 (Utah 1941).
However, the situation involving innocent third-party applicants is far different from an action between the insurance
company and its agent.

In such a case the agent knows the ex-

tent of his authority and cannot claim that he was mislead by
the principal.
For these reasons, as a matter of law, the trial court was
correct in finding that the express provisions of the contract
controlled and that therefore coverage was not afforded to the
Shannon pilot risk at the time of the accident.
POINT II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT COURSE OF
CONDUCT WAS RELEVANT, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A COURSE OF CONDUCT
EXISTED BETWEEN DYSON AND RANGER WHICH
COULD HAVE IN ANY WAY AFFECTED THE COVERAGE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
Even if it is assumed, for the sake of argument, that course
of conduct evidence is relevant, an examination of the record reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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veals that no custom or course of conduct existed under any
standard, which would require Ranger Insurance Company to insure Shannon in the operation of the airplane.

A.
The Burden is on the Appellants to Establish a Course
of Conduct.
If Appellants are to rely upon a course of conduct or
custom with the insurance company they must present clear evidence to establish it.
pellants.

The burden of proof rests with the ap-

A custom or course of conduct must be clearly provec

Where the evidence is uncertain and contradictory the custom is
not established.

25 C.J.S., Customs and Usages, Section 33, p.

128.
In order to be relevant to a particular instance, the

course of conduct relied upon must consist of the same or similar facts and circumstances.

Evidence of conduct in a particu-

lar situation or in a few instances is not sufficient to establish custom.

Hercules Powder Company v. Automatic Sprin-

kler Corporation of America, 311 P.2d 907

(Ct. App. Cal. 1957).

Appellants have failed to meet this burden and the trial
court properly ruled that no course of conduct had been established.

B.
The Instances Relied upon by Appellants as to this
Aircraft Pol~cy and Other Pol~c~es Do Not Show a Course of Conduct and are Not Analogous to the R~sk Involved ~n the Instant
Case.
Appellants' theory throughout this proceeding has been
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endorsements for a change in insurance coverage to the dates
that the soliciting agent requested the coverage, that the company has impliedly extended binding authority to the agent.
(Appellants' brief, p. 11).

Under Appellants' theory, this

implied extension of authority can be used not only by the
third-party insurance applicant but also by the insurance agent
himself.
The trial court rejected a finding of such a course of conduct.

The court stated:
In support of these contentions counsel
points to the course of dealing on the
policy in question as well as in the issuance of six other policies about which
testimony was given.
I have considered
the testimony with respect to those other
policies and do not find the facts support counsel's contention that a course
of dealing was established from which it
can be found that coverage was binding
upon submission of the pilot information
and request for the change. The facts of
each policy so issued varies and the effective date of the coverage granted on
those policies was not tied solely to receipt of completed pilot information forms.
Some of the policies relied on to show
such course of dealing did not deal with
adding pilots to policies and in some the
effective date was made in conformity with
a specific request for making the effective date that of a specific date. The
thread which Dysons seek to grasp to support their contention that a course of
deal~ng was establ~shed does not run through
all of the policy cases upon which evidence
was g~ven.
(Emphas~s added) (R., p. 261;
App. pp. A-18 - A-19).
During the trial Dyson relied upon two alleged courses of
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conduct in support of his theory of implied binding authority.
The first group consisted of the transactions occurring to the
Dyson policy itself.

The second group included other policies

issued to various individuals and

compan~es

by Dyson through

Ranger Insurance Company.
An examination of the record will show that in all examples given, the following occurred:

(1)

In many instances a

new risk had been bound orally by telephone;

(2) An additional

risk was never bound until all information was received by Ranger and until the insured knew and accepted the amount of the
premium;

(3) Policy endorsements would be "backdated" only if

no new risk was involved and no new premium was charged.

This

is in contrast to the transaction involving the addition of
Shannon as a pilot since such did involve an additional risk
and premium--yet no oral binder was requested or obtained nor
did the insured accept the additional premium.

The following

synopsis supports the contentions concerning the transactions
at issue:
1.

Transactions Involving the Dyson Policy Itself.
a.

The Issuance of the Original Policy.

The policy involved in this litigation insuring the aircraft which Shannon was piloting at the time of the accident
was initiated by a call from Mary Cartwright to A.G.A. in Cody,
Wyoming.

(Tr., p. 490).

Pursuant to that conversation an ap-
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plication for insurance was sent in by Mrs.
A.G.A. in Cody, Wyoming.

(Ex. 4DD) .

Cartwrig~t

to

The application together

with a cover memorandum were dated March 22, 1975 and requested
that the application be effective March 21, 1975.

(Ex. 23DA).

The application was received by A.G.A. on March 26, 1975
at which time the application was modified by Mr. Dave Brannon
of A.G.A. who wrote in the amount of premiums, corrected the
number of passenger seats listed, noted that an open pilot
clause was to be included, and changed the effective date from
March 21 to March 26.

(Ex. 35DA).

Brannon then quoted the premium to

~trs.

Cartwright by

telephone and upon approval issued a thirty-day binder.
pp. 712-714; Ex. 24DA).

(Tr.,

The binder was sent to A.O.A. so that

the copy was in its office on March 31.

(Tr., p. 628).

Thus, even though the policy was typed on April 1, it was
"backdated" to March 26 since a binder had been issued on that
date and Ranger Insurance was therefore liable during the 30day interim period.

The difference in the date of the typing

and the date of the coverage was attributable to an oral and
~itten

binder issued on the date of the policy.
b.

Addition of Stephen Kesler as Pilot.

Mary Cartwright on July 21, 1975 telephoned Dave Brannon
at A.G.A. and requested that Stephen Kesler be added as a pilot
~d

also that the coverage be extended to commercial use.

(Tr.,
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to commercial use (Ex. 33DA) , Brannon called Thomas Dougherty,
Vice President in charge of underwriting of A.O.A., andrequested coverage.

(Tr., p. 574}.

Authority was given and

Brannon then wrote a confirming memorandum dated July 21, 1975
changing use to include rental and adding the name "Stephen
Kesler" as a pilot.

(Ex. 7DD).

On the same date of July 21, 1975 Mary Cartwright wrote
a memorandum to A.G.A. in Wyoming changing her request for
commercial coverage but stating that Kesler should still be
added as a pilot and noting that he had approved the $21 increase in premium.

(Ex. 8DD}.

On August 20 a request was made from A.O.A. to Dyson for
more pilot information on Kesler concerning his number of total hours in various types of planes.

(Ex. 9DD).

On September 9, 1975 Torn Dougherty was called by Mrs.
Cartwright who told him that Dyson had again changed his mind
and that commercial coverage should be added to the policy.

At

that time she was quoted what the new premium for commercial
coverage would be.

(Tr., pp. 588-589; Ex. 28DD}.

On September

17, 1975 A.O.A. advised Dyson by memo that an endorsement adding Kesler and changing the policy to commercial use was being
typed.

(Ex. 10}.

The endorsement was issued September 17, 1975 effective
as of July 22, 1975, the date of the original binding phone
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The trial court correctly noted that even though the policy was issued on September 17 it was made effective July 22
because of the oral binder given by A.G.A. to Dyson.

(Tr., p.

The trial court stated:

578).

In Kesler's case the effective date of the
risk of July 22, 1975, was based upon A.O.A.'s
specific acceptance through Dougherty in his
telephone call from Brannon at A.G.A. of the
risk as to Kesler as a pilot, even though it
took until September 17, 1975, to get therequired information to A.O.A. to issue the endorsement.
(R., p. 262; App. p. A-20) (Emphasis added).
Thus, once again an oral binder had been issued and accounted for the backdating of the policy.
c.

Addition of Tim Bissell as a Pilot.

On August 26, 1975 Mrs. Cartwright sent a memorandum to
Dave Brannon at A.G.A. in Cody, Wyoming requesting Tim Bissell

be added to the policy.

(Ex. 6DD).

On September 17, 1975

A.O.A. wrote to Dyson requesting Bissell's first name be provided.

(Ex. lODD).

On September 24 Sara Broughton, an assistant underwriter

at A.O.A., wrote to Dyson on the reply portion of the August
26 memorandum and stated the following:

"Before we can approve

the above pilot please have the attached pilot form completed
by Tim Bissell."

(Emphasis added)

(Ex. 12DD).

The Dyson Agency then forwarded a completed Pilot Experience Form to A.O.A.

(Ex. 13DD; Tr., p. 670).

An endorsement
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1975, the date that the information was submitted to A.O.A.
(Ex. 14DD).
addition.

No additional premium was charged on Bissell's
(Tr., p. 630).

Thus, even though the initial request in Bissell's case
was made in August of 1975 the effective date of coverage was
not until November 13, 1975 when all of the information had
been submitted.

In Bissell's case there had been no oral bind-

er by either A.G.A. or A.O.A. prior to the receipt of the Pilot Information Form.

The effective date in this case then

was based upon the date that the last information necessary
for completion of the risk was submitted to A.O.A.
d.

Addition of Gary Ferguson as a Pilot.

On December 4, 1975 Mrs. Cartwright sent a memorandum
directly to A.O.A. in Dallas, Texas enclosing a Pilot Experience Form on Ferguson, requesting that Jim Breeze be deleted
from the policy, requesting a confirming memo on coverage, and
stating that she did not believe that an additional rate would
be needed because of Ferguson's experience.

(Ex. 15DD).

An

endorsement was issued for December 4, 1975 showing Bissell,
Dyson, Kesler, and Ferguson as the pilots covered.

(Ex. 16DD).

No additional risk was involved so no additional premium was
charged.

(Tr., p. 630).

Here, as in the Bissell case, the effective date of the
policy was related to the day that the necessary information
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like in Bissell, no additional premium was charged since no
new risk was considered by the company to have occurred.

lTr.,

p. 630).
e.

Addition of Kenneth Shannon as an Insured

Pilot.
On December 8, 1975 Mrs. Cartwright forwarded an office
memorandum to A.O.A. in Dallas, Texas enclosing a Pilot Experience Form on Shannon stating that he was to be included as a
pilot under the policy and requesting an endorsement to that
effect.

(Ex. 17DD).

On December 15, 1975 Sara Broughton wrote to Dyson on the
reply portion of the December 8 memorandum and stated the following:
This risk has reached a flying club exposure. To add this pilot it will be a fully
earned premium of $100. Please advise if
you want him added.
(Ex. 34DA).
No further written communication was made between Dyson and
A.O.A. and no endorsement adding Shannon as a named pilot was
ever issued.

(Tr., pp. 632, 634).

Mrs. Cartwright testified that in talking to Tom Dougherty
in connection with a Don Rich file on December 16, 1975 she
asked Dougherty about the endorsement on Shannon and he told
her that he would look into it.

(Tr., p. 442).

Dougherty could

not remember discussing the Shannon endorsement and his note
showed no reference to such subject matter on the December 16
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wrig~t

also

thoug~t

that she talked to Dougherty about the

Shannon endorsement in a conversation concerning Dick Reynolds.
(Tr., p. 441).

However, the record shows that the Reynolds

file was not effective until almost 11 months after the plane
had crashed.

(Tr., p. 635).

Mrs. Cartwright must have been

mistaken on that point.
The trial court found the following with regard to the
alleged conversation regarding Shannon on December 16, 1975:
If Dougherty received this call and did in
fact look into it, a reasonable inference
is that he would have seen Broughton's reply
of December 15, 1975, set out above and may
reasonably have assumed Cartwright would be
receiving it shortly.
(R., p. 259; App., p.
A-15) •
The evidence shows that the following policy procedures
were utilized by A.O.A. in determining the date of coverage:
(1) When an oral binder of coverage was given, the company
would charge a premium from the date of the binder and would
insure the risk as of that time regardless of when the application was finalized into a policy as an endorsement,
578);

(Tr., p.

(2) When a new risk was added to an existing policy and

an additional premium was required, coverage would not be effected until the additional premium had been approved by the
agent and sufficient information was available to the underwriter,

(Tr., pp. 633, 704); and (3) If no new risk was invol-

ved and no oral binder had been given the policy would be dated
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as of

t~e

time that information necessary to rate the risk had

been submitted to A.O.A. or on the specific date requested by
the agent--but no new premium would be charged.

(Tr. , pp. 611-

671) •

Applying these principles to the aforesaid examples reveals the following:

(1) As to the original policy an oral

binder was given and a premium was charged as of that date since
a risk had been assumed;

(2) As to Kesler and the change to com-

mercial usage an oral binder had been given by A.O.A. so that
this became the effective date of the endorsement and included
an additional premium since the additional risk was bound as
of that date;

(3) As to Bissell there was no oral binder issued,

and upon receipt of the Pilot Information Form the endorsement
was issued as of the date the form was submitted by Dyson but
because no additional risk was incurred the company did not require a higher premium;

(4) As to Ferguson no cral binder was

made, and upon receipt of the Pilot Information Form the date of
submission was again used since it was determined that no additional risk was incurred and therefore no additional premium
was charged;

(5) As to the addition of Shannon, no oral binder

was requested and the information received by the company showed
that an increased risk resulted causing an increase in premium
which required approval of the insured before the requested endorsement could be effectuated.
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It can readily be seen from the foregoing transaction of
this policy that Ranger Insurance Company had no regular course
of dealing with the Dyson Agency which would have justified
Dyson into believing that it had an
coverage.

impl~ed

authority to bind

In addition, unlike the insurance company in Tra-

veler's, Ranger Insurance Company received no premium advantage
from any backdating since a premium was only charged concurrently when a risk was assumed.

For these reasons, there was

no evidence showing that the transactions in the policy case
itself created a course of dealing or custom which justified
coverage by the company.

In fact, the dealings negated any in-

ference of binding authority in Dyson.

Otherwise, why did Dy-

son find it necessary to obtain an oral telephone binder when
a new risk was involved such as with the issuance of this policy and the addition of Kesler.
2.
Other Insurance Coverage Instances Relied Upon
by Dyson as Showing a Course of Conduct.
Dyson attempted to cite previous experiences with the company as tending to show the practice of backdating policies.
An analysis of these cases once again shows that the instances

were not analogous because they involved different types of coverage or complied with the criteria listed in the previous
section as to when a policy would be issued and did not create
a uniform backdating practice as found in the Traveler's case.
a.

Coverage of Rex Anderson.
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Dyson claimed that his company requested an endorsement
to be dated May 5, 1972 although the request was made May 22,
(Tr., pp. 512-513).

197 2.

Mr. Dougherty, upon examination of his files, found that
the Rex Anderson policy involved a request for substitution
of an aircraft and that the effective date of coverage was not
material because the policy provision allowed for a 30-day substitution clause which would have covered the airplane in any
event.

(Tr., pp. 698-699).
b.

Coverage of Norman Anderson.

Appellants claimed that in this case Dyson requested from
the company a broadening of the pilot clause of the policy.
His files showed that on June 26 he wrote a letter to the company requesting that coverage be changed as of June 10, 1973.
The company accordingly issued its policy on July 2, 1973 but
made the coverage effective as of the requested June 10, 1973
date.

(Tr., pp. 514-515).
Mr. Dougherty testified that the Norman Anderson case in-

volved the issuing of a new policy which was to be continued
from the insureds previous company.

After having received the

needed information and quoting the premium the policy was typed
with an effective date of May 31.
with a date of June 10.

It should have been typed

Subsequently, Dyson wrote to the com-

pany and requested that the correct date be inserted and the
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company accordingly corrected the time of coverage pursuant to
their instructions.
c.

(Tr., pp. 700-701).
Coverage of R. W. Walsh.

This involved a renewal policy of a previously insured
pilot.

The policy was typed on June 22, 1976 but was made ef-

fective June 5, 1976.

(Tr., pp. 517-518).

Mr. Dougherty explained that this renewal had been telephone bound on May 29 and that a request for a June 5 date had
been made by the Dyson Agency.
d.

(Tr., p. 701).

Coverage of Don Rich.

This case involved the addition of a pilot to a policy.
The policy was typed on April 30, 1976 and the endorsement was
dated April 16, 1976.

(Tr., p. 527).

Mr. Dougherty testified that in the Don Rich case a telephone binder had been made previous to the effective date of
coverage and that the effective date was that requested by the
agent.

The policy was typed several weeks thereafter.

(Tr., p.

702).
e.

Coverage of Dick Reynolds.

This involved a new insurance policy on a pilot.
request was dated November 15 from Dyson to A.O.A.
tified that no binder was issued on that policy.

A memo

Dyson tesHe further

stated that while the policy was typed on December 13 it had an
effective date of November 15, the date of the initial request.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
(Tr., pp. 527-528).
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-42-

Mr. Dougherty testified that on November 15 he received
a telephone call from the Dyson Agency and orally bound the
coverage.

On November 18 he received the application and pi-

lot history and on December 13 the policy was typed effective
the date it had been orally bound.

(Tr., p. 702).

These examples relied upon by Dyson to show a "course of
conduct" completely fail to meet the burden Dyson was obligated to meet even if it is assumed that such evidence was relevant to the issues in this case.

These examples once again

show that the company would "backdate" new risks only when an
oral binder had been given or when the agent specifically requested that coverage be effective as of a certain date.

In

these instances the risk was assumed as of those dates and a
premium was accordingly charged.

In the Shannon case, however,

neither an oral binder nor a specific request for a coverage
date was made.

Thus, these examples are not applicable to the

Shannon coverage question and do not show a course of conduct
or custom which Dyson could have relied upon.
It should be noted that Dyson cited only five separate
cases of insurance coverage as a basis for his "course of conduct" theory.

Even if each and every one of the five instances

was analogous to the Shannon policy such a small number (compared to the 75 transactions Dyson claimed to have had with the
company) would be legally insufficient to show any pattern upon
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instances are inapplicable.
In summary,

neither the previous transactions of this

policy nor the examples of other policies showed a course of
conduct upon which Dyson can now claim implied authority to
bind coverage.

All of the examples were varied and differed

under the factual context of each policy or endorsement.

This

evidence is hardly the type of conduct relied upon in the Traveler's case in which 300 analogous and consistent transactions had previously occurred.
C.
Torn Dougherty Did Not Make an Admission Which
was Conclusively Binding Upon Respondents.
Dyson in his brief quotes several answers to leading questions in which Mr. Dougherty, Senior Vice President in charge
of underwriting, allegedly admitted that the company would
always date a risk as of the time when all of the information
needed was submitted to the underwriter.
pp. 19-21).

(Appellants' brief,

Dyson argues, therefore, that since the Shannon

application contained all of the necessary information to rate
Shannon as a pilot that coverage automatically attached as of
December 8, 1975, date of the request.
The fallacy in Dyson's argument rests in the fact that
the addition of Shannon as a pilot resulted in an increased
risk to the company (Tr., p. 668) which required an additional
premium.

Mr. Dougherty stated in other testimony that when an

additional
risk occurred with the addition of a pilot and an
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additional premium was required it was the company policy to
request that the agent authorize the additional premium before
the endorsement would be issued.

(Tr., p. 633}.

Thus, in the

case of Shannon the company did not have all of the information necessary to add Shannon as an insured pilot, i.e., it
did not have the authorization of the insured to increase the
premium.
Mr. Dougherty's testimony concerning this area is as follows:

Q.

(By Mr. Wadsworth) You are saying when
you send this memo back saying this
would increase the premium $100 and
asking if they still wanted, that was
a request then from your office for
further information, wasn't it?

A.

It is a request whether or not they
want it.
It would not have required
us to suspense the file for followup.

Q.

You are asking for information, right?

A.

Yes.

(Tr., p. 597) (Emphasis added).

*

*

*

Q.

(By Mr. Poelman) Do you ever write coverages without the insured knowing in
advance what it is going to cost him?

A.

No.
The insured will know what it is
going to cost him.
(Tr., p. 633).

*
Q.

*

*

(By Mr. Poelman) Clarify that question further:
Were you certain the request was still outstanding at that
time?

Sponsored by theA.
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for
digitization
provided by the Institute
of Museum and
The
request
was
outstanding
because
weLibrary Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
had a Machine-generated
premium factor
that
was
still
OCR, may contain errors.

-45-

not resolved, that would have permitted us to go any further.

Q.

Did you need to know at this time
whether they really wa~ted that type
of flying club coverage?

A.

No, we didn't know.

Q.

So you needed more information, is
that correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was that the purpose of the memorandum of Sara Broughton?

A.

Yes.

(Tr., p. 634)

(Emphasis added).

Mr. Dougherty also gave two examples where a pilot addition was requested and where an additional premium was being
charged because of such addition.

The first instance involved

the Rocky Mountain Sales policy where an effective date of October 29, 1974 was given to the coverage.

On May 2, 1975 a

request was made to add an additional pilot.

At that time a

premium of $25 was quoted to the agent who then agreed to it
and a binder was issued as of that date.

(Tr., p. 652).

The second example involved the addition of Kesler as a
pilot.

(Tr., p. 654).

Dyson's own memorandum sent to A.G.A.

in Wyoming showed that the additional premium had been quoted
to Kesler in that the memo of July 21, 1975 stated "We have
quoted him the $21 increase.
ing him as a pilot."

Please send us an endorsement add-

(Ex. BDD).

Likewise, when the policy was
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phone conversation between Dyson and A.O.A. included the amount
of the additional premium.

(Tr., pp. 589-590).

It can be assumed that Mr. Dougherty's testimony quoted
in Appellants' brief was substantially correct--that is, a
policy would be dated at the time all information had been received presuming no specific request had been made by the agent
of another date or an oral binder had not been issued.

How-

ever, Mr. Dougherty's later testimony showed that all of the
information in the Shannon case was not in and that the approval of the additional premium was as necessary for the underwriter to issue coverage as was receipt of the Pilot Information Form.

In both cases coverage would be withheld until the

information was received from the agent.
Respondents do not believe it necessary to quote authorities concerning judicial admissions.

Appellants' own author-

ity, 31A C.J.S., Evidence, Section 381 (Appellants' brief, p.
21) adequately states the rule.

A judicial admission is not

binding on a party unless the statement is unequivocal, unexplained, and uncontradicted.

In this case, Mr. Dougherty's fur-

ther testimony concerning the need of premium addition approval
supplemented his previous testimony and was entirely consistent
with Respondents' position throughout the trial.
For this reason, the trial court did not err in refusing
to conclude that Mr. Dougherty had made a judicial admission
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contrary to the position of respondents.
POINT III
IT WAS THE DYSON AGENCY, NOT A.O.A. NOR
RANGER INSURANCE COMPANY, WHICH BREACHED
ITS DUTY TO COVER KENNETH SHANNON AS A
PILOT.
Dyson quotes several authorities in his brief as to the
duty that an insurance agent or a broker has to a person seeking insurance.

(Appellants' brief, p. 26).

In the Consoli-

dated Sun Ray case the following quotation is cited by Dyson:
It is generally considered that if the neglect or breach of duty of such broker results in loss to his principal, the broker
is liable to the same extent as the insurer
would have been liable had the insurance
been properly effected and must pay the resulting loss.
(Appellants' brief, p. 27).
Dyson argues that he has assumed the role of an insured
and that A.O.A. and Ranger are the equivalent to his broker or
agent.

Such an assumption is totally erroneous.

In this case

it is clear that Shannon and the other owners of the airplane
were the insureds and that Dyson acted as their broker.

A.O.A.

and Ranger were merely companies from which Dyson could obtain
insurance.

By no stretch of the imagination can A.O.A. or

Ranger be defined as a broker or agent of Dyson.
Utah State law defines a broker as:
Any person who, on behalf of the insured,
for compensation as an independent contractor, or commission, or fee, and not being
an agent of the insurer, solicits, negotiates, or procures insurance or reinsurSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ance or the renewal or continuance thereof,
or in any manner aids therein, for insureds
or prospective insureds other than himself.
Section 31-17-2, U.C.A.
This is contrasted to an "agent" who works directly for the
company.

Section 31-17-1, U.C.A.

The agency agreement between Ranger Insurance Company and
Dyson and Associates provides that Dyson shall receive a 15
per cent commission for all pleasure and business insurance
policies written.

(Ex. 2DD).

The statement of premium sent

to Dyson by A.G.A. also reflects a 15 per cent commission of
$112.20 for the initial policy coverage.

(Ex. SOD).

Likewise, the testimony at trial clearly shows that Dyson
was acting as an independent agent on behalf of the airplane
owners and that Dyson breached his duty to procure coverage for
Shannon as a pilot.

Dyson himself admitted that it was his busi-

ness as an insurance agent to obtain the type of insurance desired by an applicant and that it was Dyson's responsibility
for obtaining the proper insurance from the appropriate company.
(Tr., p. 395).

Dyson stated that he represented three separate

companies writing aviation coverage.

(Tr., p. 530).

Thus, Dyson

had no allegiance to Ranger Insurance Company and could have
Placed this risk with any company he desired.
Mr. Dougherty stated that there were approximately 5,000
insurance agencies throughout the country which had contracts
With A.O.A. for soliciting of insurance.

(Tr., p. 643).

How-
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ever, only six were given binding authority.

lTr. , p. 643) .

The other 5,000 agents did not even have the company's rates
available to them and had to call either A.O.A. or one of the
six general agents to obtain quotations.

(Tr.

1

p. 627).

Even

the six general agents which had binding authority had to notify the company by the next day of any binders issued.

(Tr.,

p. 627).
Dougherty also testified that A.O.A. administers 20 1 000
policies covering 30 1 000 separate planes.

( Tr • 1 p • 7 0 9 ) .

Dougherty stated that it is impossible for his company to monitor requests for insurance and that it is the responsibility of
the soliciting agent to follow through as to any request for
insurance.

(Tr., pp. 597, 711).

Dougherty stated that the so-

liciting agent can always call the company and obtain an oral
binder if they are concerned about coverage and the delay which
may ensue in the issuance of an endorsement.

(Tr.,p.661).

He stated that Dyson could have called in this case and Shannon
would have been orally bound had the increased premium been approved.

(Tr., p. 663).

Mrs. Cartwright stated that she would

call and obtain an oral binder if a new risk was being added to
a policy.

(Tr., p. 497).

It is only equitable and logical that the responsibility
for obtaining coverage rests upon the soliciting agent.

In thi,

case, for example, Dyson admitted that he gave the keys of the
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airplane to Shannon

althoug~

Dyson did not know whether cover-

age had been extended to Shannon.

(Tr., p. 556}.

Mrs. Cart-

wright testified that she did not know that Shannon was flying
the plane at the time the request for coverage had been submitted to A.O.A.

(Tr., p. 762).

Certainly Dyson was the per-

son who knew the status and urgency of obtaining insurance
coverage for Shannon.

He knew that Shannon was operating the

plane and that a risk was being assumed by the owners unless
illsurance coverage had been extended to cover Shannon.

A.O.A.

and Ranger Insurance Company, on the other hand, had no knowledge as to the activities of Shannon or the plane and could
not know of any urgency in extending coverage.
The trial court made the following findings concerning the
responsibility of obtaining the insurance coverage:
A.O.A. had 5,000 agencies such as Dyson with
which it had contracts, only six of which
had authority to bind without written acceptance of the risk by A.O.A. The responsibility of monitoring a request for a change in
coverage must of necessity rest upon the agency submitting that request. Six weeks expired between Cartwright's last oral inquiry
and the crash of the plane with no further
effort on Cartwright's part to obtain the
endorsement for coverage of Shannon.
(R., p.
263; App. p. A-21).
As to the negligence of the Dyson Agency and to Dyson personally
the court stated:
As to the claims of Kesler, Bissell, McClain,
Oborn, Walker, and Ferguson against the Dysons,
I find that Donald Dyson both as a partner and
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breached his contract wLth his partners to
obtain insurance coverage for all pilots
flying said plane.
I also find that Donald
Dyson individually and as an agent for his
company was negligent in allowing Shannon to
fly the plane until coverage was accepted on
Shannon by A.O.A., and also because he knew
or in the exercise of reasonable care should
have known that Mary Jane Cartwright had not
yet obtained insurance coverage for Shannon.
I further find that such negligence was a
proximate cause of the damages sustained by
the plaintiffs.
(R., p. 264; App. pp. A-21A-22) .
When Dyson agreed to obtain insurance coverage on the airplane he was acting as the agent of the owners and not the agent
of A.O.A. or Ranger Insurance Company.

Barnett v. State Auto-

mobile and Casualty Underwriters, 487 P.2d 311 (Utah 1971).

As

such, therefore, he violated the duty referred to in Appellants'
brief and was accordingly found liable to the owners for this
breach.

The trial court was correct in its decision.
POINT IV
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE TO SUPPORT THE MAILING OF THE SARA
BROUGHTON MEMO.

Dyson in his brief once again misconstrues the duties and
roles of the various parties in this case by wrongfully comparing them to other legal cases and authorities involving different factual contexts.

As noted in the preceding section, the

Dyson Agency had the burden of obtaining insurance for the airplane owners and had the duty of follow-up after the application
was sent to A.O.A.

It was the responsibility of Dyson, not
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As

sue~,

t~erefore,

t~

authorities cited by Dyson in

~s

brief are inappropriate since they concerned situations in
which an insurance applicant is suing his insurance agent for
failure to obtain insurance coverage.
30-34).

(Appellants' brief, pp.

Had A.O.A. done nothing after receipt of the appli-

cation, it still would have been Dyson's responsibility to inquire from A.O.A. as to why a coverage endorsement had not been
issued.

For this reason, the mailing of the Sara Broughton

memorandum does not assume the critical aspect that it would
in the case where an agent is attempting to shift the responsibility for failure to obtain insurance back to the insured client.
The mailing of the memo can only go to any claim that
A.O.A. was negligent in its conduct.

As stated previously,

however, A.O.A. was under no duty to take affirmative action.
Dyson's failure to follow up on his request amounted to negligence even if it were assumed the memo had never been sent.
In addition, there was ample evidence that the Sara
Broughton memorandum had been mailed to Dyson.
did not personally appear at the trial.

Miss Broughton

Her deposition had

previously been taken in Texas and was read into the record.
Appellants' counsel did not attend the deposition nor did they
submit written questions pursuant to Rule 31 U.R.C.P. to the
officer taking the deposition.
Sara
testified
t~t provided
after
t~e
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written memorandum she "mailed it back to the agent".

lR.,

pp. 7 3 9-7 4 0) .
Since no foundational objection wa5 made at the time of
the deposition it can be presumed that Sara Broughton actually
deposited the memorandum in the U.S. mail.

Rule 32(d) (3) (A),

U.R.C.P. provides that objections to the competency, relevancy,
or materiality of testimony are not waived by failure to make
objections before or during the deposition "unless the ground
of the objection is one which might have been obviated or removed if presented at that time."

Had Appellants' counsel ob-

jected to the failure of establishing sufficient foundation as
to the "mailing", Respondents' counsel could have then inquired
into Miss Broughton's statement further to determine whether
or not a sufficient foundation existed.
Appellants cannot fail to object to such a statement and
then shift the burden upon the other party after the witness is
no longer available for further testimony.

The fact that Mr.

Dougherty stated that he did not believe Sara would be the person who would actually place the memo in the mail box is merely a conflict in testimony between the two witnesses and the
trial court could choose to believe Sara's statement when
there was no showing to the contrary.
Thus, since the memorandum mailing was not a critical factor in this case and since, in any event, there was sufficient
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trial court was correct in concluding that A.O.A. was not liable to Dysons
POINT V
A.O.A. AND RANGER INSURANCE COMPANY CORRECTLY DENIED COVERAGE FOR THE LOSS IN
QUESTION.
Dyson in his brief argues that A.O.A. and Ranger Insur~ce

Company wrongfully denied coverage in this case and cites

several inter-office communications and correspondence from
the company to the Dyson Agency.
36).

(Appellants' brief, pp. 35-

Dyson observes that the reasons given for the denial of

coverage were (1) that Shannon had not been endorsed as a named
pilot, and (2) Dyson had warranted in his application that he

was the sole owner of the aircraft.

(Appellants' brief, p.

36) •

Dyson seems to contend that the insurance company did
not have the right to question the endorsement coverage nor
the ownership and that such challenge in some way harmed Dyson.
It should first be noted that the trial court held that
Ranger and A.O.A. had not accepted the risk on Shannon as a pilot since no endorsement was specifically made nor was a course
of conduct shown to impliedly cover Shannon.
p. A-21).

(R., p. 2631 App.

Thus, Dyson's discussion concerning the question of

ownership and any waiver by the insurance company by failure to
request specific information is irrelevant to the results of
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this decision.
The record shows that upon notification of the accident
A.O.A. received a memorandum from Mary Cartwright requesting
that Shannon be added as: a pilot and stating,

"Actually Mr.

Dyson sold his interest in this craft to Mr. Shannon".
19DD).

(Ex.

Up to that time A.O.A. and Ranger Insurance Company had

no knowledge that Dyson was not the sole owner of the aircraft.
Dyson admitted at trial that he made no effort to notify
the company of the additional owners.

(Tr., p. 389).

He also

admitted that had he added Shannon and requested his removal
from the policy, that a new policy would have to have been written since he no longer would have qualified as a named insured.
(Tr., pp. 418, 421).

Mr. Dougherty also stated that had the

company known that Dyson sold his interest to Shannon it would
have required that a new policy be written.

(Tr., p. 637).

Thus, the fact that A.O.A. and Ranger raised the problem
of ownership as a reason for denying the claim was perfectly
legitimate and shows no bad faith on the part of the company.
Obviously, this contention was not relied upon by the trial court
in concluding that Ranger and A.O.A. had no obligation to the
insureds.

Whether A.O.A. and Ranger waived a right to contest

the ownership provision is a moot question since the answer would
have no effect whatsoever upon the outcome of this case.
For these reasons, Dyson's claim of wrongful denial is ob-
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viously without merit since the trial court found the sufficient grounds to deny coverage.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING A TRIAL BY JURY
Rule 4-2 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts
states the following:
Cases will be set for jury trial only upon
the filing of a written request for trial
setting and the payment of the required
statutory fee.
Such written request for
trial setting, or written demand, and demands for jury trial must be filed at least
ten (10) days prior to trial or at such
other time as the trial judge may order.
Dyson admits that the granting or denying of an application for jury trial not made strictly in accord with the rules
of the court is a matter of discretion.

(Appellants' brief,

p. 40).

There is no showing that the trial court abused this discretion in denying the jury trial.

Appellants requested no

hearing as to this matter nor advanced any reasons why a request had not been previously made.
The preparation for a jury trial including instructions,
exhibits, and the method of proof is entirely different from a
trial to a judge alone.

Obviously, the parties would have had

to make enormous preparation to enlighten a jury of lay people
as to the various intricacies of the insurance industry and the
numerous
transactions
which
inby the
this
ALibrary
trial
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a judge alone, however, would not require

sue~

preparation be-

cause the court had sufficient knowledge and expertise in contractual and insurance law that such elaborate explanation and
proof were not required.
In light of the

t~~e

of case this matter involved and the

complex legal questions presented, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Appellants' eleventh-hour request.
CONCLUSION
Both Respondents and Appellants admit that the facts in
this case are basically undisputed.

There is no doubt, for

example, that the agency agreement between Dyson and Ranger prohibited Dyson from binding coverage without the approval of
A.O.A.

It is also undisputed that no express, written, or oral

permission was ever granted to Dyson by either A.O.A. or Ranger Insurance Company changing this provision.
Dyson's sole contention at the trial was that the course
of conduct between Dyson and Ranger in the past and with this
particular insurance policy constituted an implied binding authority.
The law is clear that course of conduct, custom, and usage
cannot be used to vary the express terms of the written agreement.

Thus, regardless of what transactions previously occurred

Dyson cannot legally as an agent claim he was mislead from the
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express authority he was gi.ven by the insurance company.
Dyson cannot step into the shoes of an insured applicant
and claim apparent or ostensible authority against the insurance company and his authorities and arguments to the contrary
are therefore invalid.

The Traveler's Insurance case, cited

by Dyson in his brief, is the only case found by the parties
allowing an agent to recover from the principal by an implied
binding authority caused from course of conduct.
While the Traveler's case is not the law in Utah it is
easily distinguishable on its facts since the insurance company in this case never mislead Dyson into believing that he
had binding authority, never accepted premiums after the risk
of loss had passed, and never conducted enough transactions
with Dyson concerning endorsements of additional pilots to constitute a course of conduct.
A review of the transactions involved in this policy and
the other cases relied upon by Dyson show that in each instance the date of coverage was dependent upon either a specific request by the insurance agent, an automatic renewal date
as provided in the policy, a date when all information (including the approval of the premium) was available to the underwriter, or when an oral binder had been made by the company.
These varied circumstances did not give rise to a course of
conduct, even assuming such to be relevant, which would misSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lead Dyson into believing he had binding authority.
It was Dyson, not A.O.A., who breached the duty to the
airplane owners.

It was Dyson's responsibility to obtain the

insurance since he was the only person who knew the exigency
of the situation and the requirements of the owners.

The trial

court's finding that Dyson had failed to follow up properly
on this application and had even given Shannon the keys to the
airplane without confirming coverage is amply supported by the
record.
Likewise, the attempt of Dyson to shift the blame upon
the company regarding the mailing of the Sara Broughton memorandum is equally ineffectual.

It was Dyson's duty, not A.O.A.'s

or Ranger's, to follow up and see why coverage had not been afforded to Shannon.

In any event, however, there was sufficient

evidence for the trial court to conclude that the memorandum
had in fact been mailed to the Dyson Agency and that A.O.A.
acted in good faith.
Dyson's claim that coverage was wrongfully denied is also
without merit.

The fact that Dyson failed to inform the com-

pany as to the true ownership of the plane and the fact that
the company was justifiably concerned with this question did not
show bad faith in denying coverage.

However, since the trial

court only ruled that no specific endorsement had been made covering Shannon as a pilot the question of ownership was moot
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and i& not relevant to this appeal.
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to grant Appellants a jury trial in view of the late~ess

of the request, the complexity and difficulty of the case,

and the hardship which would otherwise have been

~posed

on

the other parties.
For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court should
be affirmed and costs awarded to Respondents.
R:spectfully submitted,)

~~~I.A.<'~•-\ \:
(

',-;<

L-._._------

stuart L. Poelrnan
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
200 South Main, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondents
Aviation Office of America, Inc.
and Ranger Insurance Company
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(R., p. 249)
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DONALD A. DYSON, ET AL,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.

Civil No. 234988

AVIATION OFFICE OF AMERICA,
ET AL,
Defendants.

The above entitled case carne on for trial before the Court
on September 20, 1977, continued through September 23, 1977,
and was argued on October 4, 1977, following which the Court
took the case under advisement.

At the trial Raymond A. Hintze

appeared as counsel for plaintiffs Kesler, Bissell, McClain,
Oborn, and Walker and R. Clark Arnold appeared as counsel for
intervening plaintiff Ferguson.

H. Wayne Wadsworth appeared as

counsel for third party defendants LeRoy F. Dyson and L. F. Dyson and Associates, Inc., with Wallace R. Lauchnor appearing
as counsel for Donald A. Dyson as plaintiff and third party defendant.

Stuart L. Poelman appeared as counsel for defendants

and third party plaintiffs Aviation Office of America (hereinafter referred to as AOA) and Ranger Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as Ranger) .
Sinceby the
the
caseLaw involved
third
cross
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claims a brief summary of the pleadings appears necessary to
help put the issues in focus.

The case arises out of the

crash of an airplane, a twin engine Cessna Turbo Skymaster,
FAA No. N 2496S, which occurred on February 1, 1976, in Salt
Lake County.

The plane was purchased in March, 1975 under an

oral and rather informal partnership arrangement by five of
the original plaintiffs, Dyson, Kesler, Bissell, McClain and
Oborn.

The purchase price was $27,000.00 and was entirely fi-

nanced by Walker Bank and Trust Company with said five parties
all signing a promissory note.

The bank required full insur-

ance coverage which Dyson as an insurange (sic) agent associated with his father, LeRoy F. Dyson, in L. F. Dyson and Asso-

ciates, a Nevada Corporation, assured his partners he would and
did obtain.
(R., p.

250)

Dyson readily admits his responsibility to obtain such insurance and likewise readily admits his liability or that of his
agency to his partners and their assignees if it be determined
that the plane in fact was not covered by the insurance policy
at the time it crashed on February 1, 1976, because it was the!
being flown by defendant Shannon.

Walker appears as plaintiff

in this case by reason of an agreement between him and McClain
by which Walker purchased McClain's interest in the plane, but
w ith McClain remaining liable on the note to the bank and Wal
ker not being a signator thereon.

Ferguson appears as an in-
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tervening plaintiff by reason of the fact that under an agreement dated October 15, 1975, plaintiff Oborn contracted to sell
~is

interest in the plane to Ferguson, but with Oborn remain-

ing liable on the note to the bank and Ferguson not being a signator thereon.
The Dyson insurance agency had an agency contract with AOA
who in turn were underwriters of insurance for Ranger.
dealt exclusively with aviation insurance.

AOA

Donald A. Dyson

through his own agency obtained a policy of insurance covering
said plane, the details concerning which and the endorsements
thereto will more fully be hereinafter set forth.
son alone was the named insured.

Donald A. Dy-

Dyson contracted to sell his

interest in the plar.e to defendant Kenneth R. Shannon in December, 1975, and it was Shannon who was flying the plane on February 1, 1976, when it crashed in Salt Lake County.

AOA and Ran-

ger denied the claim for damages to the plane which was totally
wrecked but which brought a salvage value of $4,236.00, which
amount, when received, was paid over to Walker Bank.

The rea-

son for Ranger denying coverage was its claim that Shannon was
not an authorized pilot under the policy, as will more fully be
set out in a summary of the evidence which follows.
(R., p. 251)
After the claim was denied attorney Hintze filed a
complaint on behalf of Dyson, Kesler, Bissell, McClain, Oborn
and Walker naming AOA, Ranger and Shannon as defendants.

Mr.
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Hintze later withdrew as counsel for Donald Dyson individually
as the insured and attorney Lauchnor filed an appearance as
counsel for Donald Dyson.

By this complaint the plaintiffs

therein allege the policy was in full force and effect and
covered Shannon as pilot and thus they seek to recover the face
amount of the policy of $27,000, costs, other relief as may
seem just, and, as added by amendment, interest on the value
of the aircraft from the date of loss to the date of payment.
In a separate count of the complaint it is alleged that Shannon
was negligent in his operation of the plane and plaintiffs seek
to recover the sum of $29,000, the alleged fair market value of
the plane, and costs from Shannon.
Based upon a motion filed by attorney Hintze for his clients the Court on September 2, 1976, entered an order authorizing service of summons on Shannon by mail pursuant to Rule 4(f)
(2) and said service was effected by the County Clerk's office
mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to Shannon on September 9, 1976.

Shannon filed no answer to the complaint and

his default was ordered entered by the Court.

Neither Dyson,

AOA or Ranger filed any pleading against Shannon and Donald Dyson never obtained service on Shannon.
In response to plaintiffs' complaint AOA and Ranger answered, denying liability or coverage with Shannon as pilot,
denying Dyson had authority to bind coverage, alleging express
refusal to cover Shannon and setting forth other defenses.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A-4

Said

parties also filed a third party complaint against Donald and
LeRoy Dyson and the Dyson Corporation, alleging the filing of
the complaint and asserting that if said parties were determined to be liable under the policy, said third party defendants were liable to them for negligence, breach of duty as
agents to third party plaintiffs and intentional misrepresentation of facts in the various particulars alleged.
(R., p. 252)

In answer thereto the Dysons denied liability to AOA and
Ranger, or that they

~cted

wrongfully, and affirmatively allege

an estoppel as a defense, based upon an alleged establishrr.ent
of a course of conduct with respect to endorsements on changes
in coverage, and contributory neqligence.
Following the filing of the third party complaint by AOA
and Ranger against the Dysons, plaintiffs Kesler, Bissell, McClain, Oborn and Walker filed a cross claim against the Dysons,
alleging breach of Donald Dyson's agreement to obtain insurance
coverage on the plane, seeking damages including attorney's
fees.

In reply the Dysons allege their agency did all they

were obligated to do in obtaining insurance coverage on the
Plane and allege negligence by these plaintiffs as a defense:
(At the trial these defenses were dropped and the Dyson agency
admitted liability to said plaintiffs if no insurance coverage
by theto
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
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Based upon the cross claim of said plaintiffs against the
Dysons, the Dysons filed a counterclaim against AOA and Ranger
alleging that if they were found liable to those plaintiffs,
AOA and Ranger were liable to them, asserting that AOA failed
to reject an application to add Shannon as a pilot covered by
the policy, and that by reason of a prior course of conduct
and a failure to davise the Dysons to the contrary, they impliedly agreed to such coverage.

Further the Dysons allege AOA

had a duty to advise the Dysons that Shannon was not covered by
the policy and that such failure constituted negligence for
which AOA and Ranger should be held liable to them.

In reply

to this counterclaim AOA and Ranger deny such liability and by
way of affirmative defenses, said partles allege contributory
negligence of Dysons, plead estoppel for failure to diligently
respond to correspondence and inquiry about coverage of Shannon,
allege misrepresentations of Dyson concerning ownership, and
assumption of risk.
(R., p. 253)
At a pretrial settlement conference held on September 12,
1977, it was stipulated by all counsel that plaintiff Ferguson
could intervene as Oborn's vendee.

He has done so and stands

in the same shoes as the other individ~al plaintiffs other than
Donald Dyson.
In this memorandum I shall not undertake to summarize the
testimony of the respective witnesses as called, but rather will
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summarize what I consider to be the material and relevant
facts as established by the evidence.
AOA underwrites aviation insurance for Ranger and other
insurance

compan~es,

and as such has agency contracts with some

5,000 agents throughout the country, only six of whom have written authority to bind AOA and its insurers on aviation policies
without the prior approval of AOA.

On February 14, 1968, Ran-

ger through AOA executed an agency agreement with LeRoy and
Donald Dyson, dba L. F. Dyson and Associates by which the Dysons were appointed "agent" of Ranger for aviation hazards only.
The agreement, among other things, contained the following provision:
"Nothing herein shall be construed as authorizing the agent to commit or bind the company
to any liability without the prior approval of
Aviation Office of America, Inc."
The agency agreement remained in force throughout the period relating to this case.

On December 30, 1974, Ranger through

AOA entered into an agency agreement with Aviation General Agency
(hereinafter called AGA) of Cody, Wyoming appointing AGA as an
agent with authority to bind AOA and represented insurance companies on "business and pleasure" risks, but with no authority
to bind on "limited commercial" risks, within the stated limits
of coverage.

Dyson was advised of the availability of AGA as

an agency authorized to act for AOA.
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(R., p. 254)
In march,

(sic) 1975, Donald Dyson, Kesler, Bissell, Mc-

Clain and Oborn orally agreed to purchase the Cessna plane in
question as equal partners for $27,000.

They borrowed the full

amount of the purchase price from Walker Bank & Trust Company
on March 18, 1975, and jointly signed a promissory note, on
which they each became jointly and severally liable, for the
face amount of $38,519.88

(interest rate of 10.58%), payable

in 84 successive monthly installments of $458.57 each commenc-

ing April 25, 1975.
ment on the plane.

The note was secured by a security agreeAt the time of the transaction Walker Bank

stated that the plane must be fully insured.

Donald Dyson

agreed with his other four partners that he would take care
of obtaining the required insurance coverage on the plane, it
being known by his said four partners that he was then in the
insurance business as an insurance agent, and he then knew
that they were relying upon him to do so.

At the trial the Dy-

sons acknowledged that Donald Dyson had a duty to obtain the
required insurance coverage.

At this time only Donald Dyson

was a licensed pilot and it was the intent of the other four
partners to learn to fly the plane and to be licensed therefor.
Donald Dyson then had prepared, and he signed, an "application" for aircraft insurance on an AOA form, requesting insurance on the Cessna plane with a liability coverage of $27,000
on the plane for all risks while in motion.

The application
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showed only Donald A. Dyson as the insured, marking it as an
"individual" ownership rather than a "partnership" ownership.
In section 7 of the application it named Donald A. Dyson and
Jim Breeze, an FAA Examiner, as pilots with "additional pilots
to be added as they qualify".

Walker Bank was shown as mort-

gagee.
On March 22, 1975, Mary Jane Cartwright, an employee of
Dyson, forwarded the written application to "Aviation Office
of America, P. 0. Box 7, Cody, Wyoming, " which was the address
of AGA.

It stated that an application "to be effective 3/21/75

covering a 1968 Cessna for Donald A. Dyson was enclosed, requesting a policy at the earliest convenience, stating the purpose
was "pleasure" and suggesting language for the pilot clause.
(R.

I

p. 255)

On March 26, 1975, AGA insured binder 1020 confirming it
had bound with AOA insurance coverage on the plane for 30 days
effective March 26, 1975.

Based upon said application, policy

No. AC Al-198882 was issued by Ranger to Donald Dyson as the
named insured, under date of April l, 1975, and effective from
i1arch 26, 1975 to March 26, 1976.

The total premium was stated

as $748.00 with $400.00 thereof being charged for the $27,000
liability for all risks while in motion.

The pilot clause pro-

vided that "Only the following pilot or pilots holding valid
and effective pilot and medical certificates with ratings as
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Then followed the names Donald A. Dyson or Jim Breeze (together with private or commercial pilots with a minimum number of logged hours which phrase admittedly did not cover any
of the parties hereinvolved).
The policy contained a provision in paragraph 19 thereof
which provided as follows:

" ••. nor shall the terms of this

policy be waived or changed, except by improved endorsement
issued to form a part of this policy, signed by the authorized
company representative".
In April, 1975, the premium due on the policy was billed
to L.F. Dyson and Associates by AGA.
Mary Jane Cartwright handled the processing of insurance
for the Dyson agency and Donald Dyson had nothing to do with
contacting AOA or Ranger on the policy.
The first steps to effecting a change in the policy occurred on July 21, 1975, when a request was made of AGA by Cartwright to add plaintiff Kesler as a pilot to be covered.

Cart-

wright did not recall how her contact with AGA was made to initiate this change but on that date AGA through David Brannon
sent a handwritten communication to Tom Dougherty at AOA "confirming our telcon of today" and stating effective "7-22", AOA
was to change use to include rental and also adding Stephen
Kesler as a named pilot and stating liability premium was increased $21.00 and the Hull coverage by $203.00.
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(R., p. 256)
Also on July 21, 1975, Cartwright typed a written note to
oave Brannon in Cody saying "Sorry - change signals again" and
telling him to delete the earlier request to cover rental of
the plane commercially.

She then stated it was necessary to

change the pilot clause to include Kesler, stating some facts
~out

his experience, saying the $21.00 increase had been quo-

ted to him and concluding by saying "Please send us an endorsement adding him as a pilot."
By a memo dated August 20, 1975, from the AOA office in
Beaumont, Texas, to L. F. Dyson and Associates a request was
~de

to forward pilot information on Kesler as AOA needed to

know specific information "before we can add as approved pilot."
On August 26, 1975, Cartwright wrote Brannon at AGA in
Cody requesting addition of Tim Bissell as a pilot and also
stating therein that "we had previously requested that you add
Stephen Kesler, however we have not received any confirmation
from you that these are being added.

We would appreciate a

note to that affect (sic) for our file."

This was received in

the AGA office on August 28, 1975, and on a copy thereof, under
date of September 24, 1975, Sara Broughton of AOA in Texas
wrote "before we can approve above pilot please have the attached pilot form completed by Tim Bissell."
On September 9, 1975, Tom Dougherty made a written record
of a telephone conversation he had with "Dyson" requesting a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sel and Kesler.
On September 17, 1975, the AOA office in Texas sent a
communication to L. F. Dyson and Associates requesting advice
as to Bissell's first name so he could be added as a named
pilot and stating that an endorsement adding Kesler as pilot
and changing use to limited commercial was then being typed.
That endorsement was issued, dated September 17, 1975, showing
Kesler as an added pilot and the purpose of use as "limited
commercial" with a total additional premium of $302.00, with
the effective date of the endorsement being July 22, 1975,
which was the date, as noted above, that it had been agreed by
Dougherty (AOA)

in his telephone communication with Brannon

(AGA) on July 21, 1975, would be the effective date for adding
coverage on Kesler as a pilot.
(R., p. 257)
The requested pilot experience form, updated, was filled
out, signed by Bissell, and submitted so that an endorsement
was issued December 2, 1975, by AOA for Ranger amending Item 7
of the policy to add "Torn Bissell".

The effective date of this

endorsement was November 13, 1975, which was the date the pilot
information sheet was forwarded to AOA in Dallas by Cartwright
on Bissell.

No additional premium was required on Bissell.

As noted supra, McClain had sold his interest to Walker
and Oborn had sold to Ferguson under a contract dated October
15, 1975, in which Ferguson agreed to pay Oborn's share of the
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amount due Walker Bank.
After the contract of sale to Ferguson on November 5, 1975,
:-1ary Jane Cartwright sent a memorandum to AOA, but addressed it
toP. 0. Box 7 in Cody, Wyoming, stating they had another name
to add to the policy - Gary Ferguson - and for this they needed
additional pilot information forms to be completed and requested a small supply for Dyson's use.

Brannon at AGA replied to

this by directing that they "use Item #7 of the regular application."
On November 13, 1975, in Cartwright's memorandum to AOA
in Dallas enclosing Bissell's pilot information sheet (mentioned supra), she also requested more pilot information forms
"as we have another commercial pilot to be added to this policy".
Thereafter, Mary Jane Cartwright forwarded on December 4,
1975, a memorandum to AOA in Dallas, Texas, enclosing a pilot's
statement on Ferguson, requested that Breeze be deleted, requested a confirming memo and stated that since Ferguson had
so many hours, it was doubtful the rate would be affected.
(R.

I

p. 258)

Under date of December 10, 1975, AOA issued an endorsement effective December 4, 1975, amending Item 7 to show Bissell, Dyson, Kesler and Ferguson as the pilots covered.

No change in

premium resulted.
Also, about December 1, 1975, Dyson sold his interest in
the plane to Kenneth Richard Shannon on a contract under which
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Shannon agreed to assume Dyson's obligation to lvalker Bank.
Dyson's partners in the plane voiced concern about Shannon's
qualifications and ability, but he made some inquiry, advised
them he was licensed by FAA and experienced and assured them
they were protected in their investment by insurance coverage.
However, Dyson did not advise either AOA or AGA of the sale of
his ownership interest to Shannon nor did he request any change
in the policy.

He only told Mary Jane Cartwright to take the

necessary steps to get Shannon's name added to the policy as
a pilot.

Dyson did not tell Cartwright to have his own name

dropped as a pilot or as the insured nor did he tell her he
had sold his interest in the plane to Shannon.

Dyson either

gave Shannon a key to the plane or left it with Cartwright for
Shannon to pick up although Cartwright had no recollection that
she received the key from Dyson or gave it to Shannon.
Thereafter, on December 8, 1975, Cartwright forwarded an
office memorandum to AOA in Dallas, Texas, enclosing a pilot
experience form on Shannon stating he was to be included as a
pilot under the policy and requesting an endorsement to this
effect.

This communication was received by AOA in Dallas and

on December 15, 1975, Sara Broughton, an employee of AOA whose
underwriting duty it was to make changes in existing policies,
wrote in reply thereto the following:
"This risk has reached a flying club exposure.
To add this pilot it will be a fully
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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you want him added."
(R., p. 259)
In a deposition taken in Dallas, Texas on September 13,
1977, Sara Broughton testified she mailed this response to the
Dyson agency.

Mary Jane Cartwright denied ever seeing this re-

sponse or having received it in the mail.
having received or seeing it.

Dyson too denied ever

Thus, no further written commu-

nication was sent in response thereto and no endorsement adding Shannon's name was ever issued by AOA.

Cartwright testi-

fied that in talking to Torn Dougherty in connection with a file
on one Don Rich on December 16, 1975, she asked him about the
endorsement on Shannon, stating he said he would look into it.
Dougherty did not personally recall this telephone conversation with Cartwright but did not deny having it as his file on
Rich contained notes of a telephone call from Cartwright on
December 16, 1975, but they contained no reference to Shannon.
If Dougherty received this call and did in fact look into it,
a reasonable inference is that he would have seen Broughton's
reply of

Dece~er

15, 1975, set out above and may reasonably

have assumed Cartwright would be receiving it shortly.

Cart-

wright also testified she recalled asking Dougherty about the
Shannon endorsement in talking to him on a policy for one Dick
Reynolds.

However, Dougherty's file on Reynolds shows his pol-

icy was not effective until November 15, 1976, some 10-1/2
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The crash occurred on that date with Shannon at the controls and flying it.

As noted, the plane was totally wrecked.

A notation on a claim form dated February 2, 1976, indicated
the accident occurred because while landing, the runway was
missed, and the plane hit power lines and crashed.

It appears

Shannon's wife and two children were injured in the crash and
hospitalized as a result thereof.
On February 15, 1976, Cartwright wrote a letter to Dougherty at AOA enclosing a copy of the Dyson memo "dated December
7, 1975" (actually dated December 8) wherein "we requested that
you add Kenneth Shannon as a pilot to the above captioned policy
in the name of Mr. Dyson."
(R., p. 260)

She further stated:

"We have never received a confirming

memo or endorsement to the policy.

Actually Mr. Dyson sold

his interest in the craft to Mr. Shannon.

We would appreciate

an endorsement at your earliest convenience", adding a postscript "Perhaps this request hit your office when you were in
the process of moving and thus the delay.

We would appreciate

the endorsement."
The move by AOA from Beaumont to Dallas had in fact been
made in the

s~~er

of 1975.

Dougherty replied on March 1, 1976, noting that "we quoted
the amount of premium required to add pilot but did not receive
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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policies and advance approval of the company would be needed.
Dougherty's files also contained notations dated March l, 1976
of a telephone call with Tom Lehman (manager) General Adjustment Bureau, Albuquerque, New Mexico)

(sic) in which he recorded

that they did not add the pilot because they had "no reply to
Sara B's 12/15 memo".
It was stipulated that the proof of loss or claim required
under the policy had been duly filed.
By letter dated March 30, 1976, to Donald A. Dyson, Tom
Lehman advised that he regretted to advise him that there was
no coverage

~nder

the policy for the claims arising out of

the accident, as Shannon was not a named pilot under the terms
of the policy nor did he qualify under the open pilot endorsement.

It further stated that Dyson had warranted under tne

application for aircraft insurance that he was the sole owner,
but that the records of the FAA and their own f'J.rther investigation indicated this information was incorrect.
From the foregoing facts it is thus apparent that no written endorsement approving the addition of the name of Shannon
as a pilot to Item 7 of the policy was ever issued.

It is also

apparent that Donald Dyson did nothing more to get Shannon's
name added to the policy as a pilot than to direct Mary CartWright to do it and that he released the key to Shannon without
ever making any inquiry of her as to whether the coverage for
Shannon
had in fact been effected. Cartwright testified that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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at this time her work load in the office was heavy and that perhaps she was not following up on endorsement requests as she
should have done.

(R., p. 261)
Counsel for the Dysons contends that in the course of
dealing between Dyson and AOA, whether it be through AGA or
direct, binding coverage was effecteJ by the submission of a
completed pilot information form together with a request for
issuance of an endorsement making such change, and that the
issuance or receipt of a signed endorsement making such coverage effective was not necessary.

In support of this contention

counsel further contends that AOA's alleged established practice of making the effective date of the coverage the same as
the date of the submission of the request for coverage and the
completed pilot information form, rather than the date the endorsement was issued, shows that coverage was binding upon Dyson's submission of such information and that Shannon was covered notwithstanding the lack of issuance of a written endorsement.
In support of these contentions counsel points to the
course of dealing on the policy in question as well as in the
issuance of six other policies about which testimony was given.
I have considered the testimony with respect to these other policies and do not find the facts support counsel's contention
that a course of dealing was established from which it can be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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found that coverage was binding upon submission of the pilot
information forms.

Some of the policies relied on to show

such course of dealing did not deal with adding pilots to
policies and in some the effective date was made in conformity
with a specific request for making the effective date that of
a specific date.

The thread which Dysons seek to grasp to

support their contention that a course of dealing was established does not run through all of the policy cases upon which
evidence was given.
{R., p. 262)
The strongest element in Dysons' argument is the practice
of AOA in making the effective date of the endorsement or policy that of the date of submission of the request together with
the required information, rather than the date of typing such
endorsement or policy.

Counsel cites Lewis v. Travelers Insur-

ance Company, 239 A.2d 4 as a case in point.

In that case the

practice of "backdating" the policy to the date of the request
was shown to have existed in some 300 policies and the Court
ruled that this practice implied, as between principal and agent,
authority in the agent to bind a risk pending "the principal's
decision on the application".

The Court goes on to say that not-

withstanding a written contract that in effect requires written
authorization or acceptance, the parol evidence rule did not bar
Proof of changes subsequent to the execution of the integrated
writing.
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Accepting those principles, in the case at bar it cannot
be said that the proof submitted establishes a confirmed practice of "backdating" from which can be implied the authority
of Dyson to bind the risk on a new pilot merely by the submission of a pilot information form.

In Kesler's case the effec-

tive date of the risk of July 22, 1975, was based upon AOA's
specific acceptance through Dougherty in his telephone call
from Brannon at AGA of the risk as to Kesler as a pilot, even
though it took until September 17, 1975, to get the required information to AOA to issue the endorsement.
In Bissell's case the initial request was made in August,
1975, at which time it is by no means clear that Mary Jane Cartwright even was aware of the requirement for submission of a
pilot information form.

In the weeks that followed the endorse-

ment when finally issued was made effective November 13, 1975,
the date the information form was finally submitted by Cartwright.
In Ferguson's case the endorsement was requested December
4, 1975, and was issued December 10, 1975, dropping Breeze from
coverage and adding Ferguson without any change in premium.
(R.

I

p. 262)

In Shannon's case the request involved a change in the
coverage to a "flying club" status, as well as an additional
premium, and it is apparent from the memo of Sara Broughton of
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cance although the matter of additional premium payments was
®iformly discussed and agreed upon before an endorsement effecting a change was agreed to and issued by the company.
Broughton's note to Dyson, the receipt of which was denied,
does not support an implication that as of that date Ranger
was bound on Shannon and so understood it.
AOA had 5,000 agencies such as Dyson with which it had
contracts, only six of which had authority to bind without written acceptance of the risk by AOA.

The responsibility of moni-

toring a request for a change in coverage must of necessity
rest upon the agency submitting that request.

Six weeks ex-

pired between Cartwright's last oral inquiry and the crash of
the plane with no further effort on Cartwright's part of obtain
the endorsement for coverage of Shannon.
I therefore find that as of February l, 1976, when Shannon
crashed the plane while flying it, AOA and Ranger had not accepted the risk on Shannon as a pilot, had issued no endorsement
~d

are not liable to Donald A. Dyson individually as the insured

~der

tion.

the policy nor to the Dyson agency under the policy in quesAs to AOA and Ranger as against all other parties, I find

the issues in favor of AOA and Ranger and render a judgment of
no cause of action.
As to the claims of Kesler, Bissell, McClain, Oborn, Walker
and Ferguson against the Dysons, I find that Donald Dyson both
as a partner and as an agent of L. F. Dyson and Associates
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breached his contract with his partners to obtain insurance
coverage for all pilots flying said plane.

I also find that

Donald Dyson individually and as agent for his company was negligent in allowing Shannon to fly the plane until coverage
was accepted on Shannon by AOA, and also because he knew or in
the exercise of reasonable care should have known that Hary
Jane Cartwright had not yet obtained insurance coverage for
Shannon.

(R., p. 264)
I further find that such negligence was a proximate cause of
the damages sustained by the plaintiffs.
As to damages plaintiffs seek recovery for loss of their
plane as well as interest on the value of the aircraft since
the date the claim was denied by Ranger, interest paid to Walker Bank and which must yet be paid pending final settlement,
and attorney's fees incurred by the litigation in question.
For loss of the plane said plaintiffs are entitled to dam·
ages for breach of contract in the amount of the insurance coverage plaintiffs would have received had Donald Dyson obtaine<
insurance coverage for Shannon's flying of the plane.

This

would be 4/5 of the insurance coverage of $27,000.00, less sal
vage value.

For damages caused by Dyson's negligence plain-

tiffs would be entitled to 4/5 of the fair market value of the
plane as of February 1, 1976, less salvage value.

The maximum

recovery allowed would be the greater of either of these two
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As to interest, plaintiffs are entitled to recover from
defendants Dyson interest on the amount of their recovery at
6% per annum from February 1, 1976, until paid.

No recovery

for interest paid by plaintiffs to Walker Bank is recoverable
since they are allowed interest on damages from the loss of the
plane and would have paid interest to Walker Bank irrespective
of the loss of the plane.
As to attorneys' fees, counsel for said plaintiffs claim
they are entitled to recover such fees under the rule as stated
by the Supreme Court of Utah in Pacific Coast Title Insurance
Co. v. Hartford Ace. & Ind. Co., 7 U 2d 377, 325 P 2d 906,
wherein the court said the general rule that attorney's fees
are not generally recoverable unless expressly provided for by
contract or authorized by statute applies
" ... to claims for attorney's fees within
the action itself •.. ",
but that the rule as to what damages are recoverable for breach
of contract is based upon the concept of reasonable forseeability
that loss of such general character would result from the breach.

(R., p. 265)
Therefore, to be compensable, the loss must result from the
breach in the natural and usual course of events, so that it
can fairly and reasonably be said that if the minds of the parties had adverted to breach when the contract was made, loss of
such character would have been within their contemplation.
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Is this rule applicable under the facts of the case now
before the court?
In the case just cited the defendant Hartford had furnished a bond for a general contractor on

wh~ch

the plaintiff,

a title insurance company, was made obligee with the bond reciting it would save the title insurance company harmless from
defaults on the part of the contractor with respect to each lot
in the subdivision involved therein.

When the contractor failed

to pay material and labor costs on various lots, liens were
filed and foreclosed which the title insurance company had to
defend, settle and pay.

This involved incurring attorney's

fees in resolving the lien claims and in holding that such attorney's fees were recoverable under the

afore~entioned

rule,

the court said that applying the rule to the case, it could
reasonably be foreseen that the natural and usual consequence
of the contractor's failure to pay the laborers and materialmen
would bring about the series of events which occurred; namely
that liens would be filed and legal proceedings instituted to
enforce them; that the plaintiff title insurance company, having
the duty to keep the titles clear, would interpose defenses and
attend to some disposition of the claims which would require the
services of attorneys and court costs incidental thereto and
which was the type of loss for which Hartford's bond was given
to guard against.
[R., p. 266)
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In the two ALR annotations cited by

trr.

Arnold in his

brief (45 ALR 2d 1183 and 4 ALR 3rd 270) the fact situations
described to which the Hartford case rule applies all suggest
that the claim for attorney's fees must be fees incurred in a
separate prior litigation with third parties which the party
claiming attorney's fees was required to defend because of the
negligence or breach of contract of the party against whom recovery of such fees is now being sought.

The annotation at 45

ALR 2d 1183 puts it this way:
"It (exception to the general rule) involves
the question whether plaintiff, having been
involved in litigation with others through
the tortious act of the defendant, may in a
separate action recover as part of the damages the attorney's fees incurred by him in
the earlier litigation with such third person.
"In order that this question may arise the
following elements must be present:
(1)
Plaintiff must have incurred attorney's fees
in the prosecution or defense of a prior action .... (2) The litigation must have been
against a third party and not against the defendant in the present action.
(3) Plaintiff
must have become involved in such litigation
because of some tortious of the defendant ••• "
To answer the question stated supra, we must examine the
facts of the case.

When the five original partners purchased

the plane, no written partnership agreement was ever drawn up
and Donald Dyson's four partners looked to him as a partner and
insurance agent to obtain the required insurance coverage on
the plane.

He did so but failed to complete the necessary steps
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to get coverage on Shannon before releasing the plane to Shannon to fly at Shannon's will.

However, the policy he obtained

named only Donald Dyson as the insured, with him representing
in his application that he as the named insured was the sole
owner of the plane.

(Item 9 of the policy).

Dyson never ad-

vised AOA or Ranger of any ownership interest in Kesler, Bissell, Oborn or

~cClain,

nor in Walker as McClain's vendee, nor

in Ferguson as Oborn's vendee, nor in Shannon as his own vendee.
Thus, none of these parties were a named insured under the policy and none of them would have been entitled to receive or recover the policy coverage had coverage for Shannon been effected.

Walker Bank as the mortgagee would have been entitled to

first claim on the proceeds and the individual partners or
their vendees would have had to look to Dyson for their share
of the insurance proceeds, if any, over and above the amount
payable to the bank.

(R., p. 267)
The significance of this fact is that from the beginning
none of the partner-owners except Dyson had any claim against
AOA or Ranger on the policy.
son's as the named insured.

The claim, if any, was solely DyBut when the lawsuit was started,

the complaint was filed by Donald Dyson, Kesler, Bissell, McClain, Oborn and Walker as plaintiffs and AOA, Ranger and Shannon as defendants.

It was not until after AOA and Ranger filed

their
answer
andLawtheir
third
party
complaint
against
the
Dysons
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and their com9any, that counsel for plaintiffs withdrew as
attorney for Donald Dyson and thereafter asserted a claim on
behalf of the other plaintiffs against Donald Dyson, his father and their company.

They nevertheless pursued their claim

against AOA and Ranger notwithstanding the fact that none of
them were named insureds under the policy and had no evidence
that either AOA or Ranger was aware of their ownership interest
in the plane.
Their remedy in this case was against the Dysons, not AOA
or Ranger, a fact which appeared to have been recognized at
the time of trial with the Dysons assuming the burden of trying to establish coverage of Shannon under the policy in the
trial.

At the beginning of the trial it was stipulated that if

coverage for Shannon was not established, Donald Dyson and his
company, having the duty to obtain coverage in the first place,
would be liable to plaintiffs if he had indeed failed to do so.
Thus it seems apparent to me that the attorneys' fees incurred by the plaintiffs were incurred in the pursuit of their
claim against the Dysons and are fees claimed
"within the action itself",
not in a prior action, so as to render them non-recoverable under the general rule that such are not recoverable unless expressly provided for by contract as stated in the Hartford case.
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(R., p. 268)
Not being named insureds under the policy, it does not appear
to me that it can be said that under such circumstances it
could be reasonably foreseeable that plaintiffs would incur
attorneys' fees in pursuing a claim against AOA and Ranger on
a policy in which they had no legal interest.

Their remedy

is and always has been against the Dysons for breach of contract and negligence, under neither of which cause of action
can they recover attorneys' fees, and I so find.
As to Ferguson, he stands with Oborn in the same pair of
shoes and can recover no more in this case than Oborn.

One

thing more needs to be said in regards to Ferguson's claim for
attorney's fees.

He intervened as a plaintiff at the pretrial

hearing held a week before trial upon stipulation of counsel
that his rights in the case were no more than those of Oborn.
In his memorandum in support of his claim for attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation, counsel states that the bulk of his
fees arose "when Ferguson was forced to join the instant litigation".

This position is based upon a suggestion made at the

pretrial settlement conference that if he did not join as a party, he might be collaterally estopped from asserting any future
claim in the case.

I cannot accept the suggestion made by the

pretrial conference judge as either an order that he must join
or a ruling that if he did not do so, collateral estoppel would
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However, he did join as an intervening plaintiff in a case
that involved a claim against AOA and Ranger as well as the
Dysons and the foregoing ruling made with respect to recovering attorney's fees for his vendor, Oborn, and the others must
apply equally well to him.
While it is regrettable under the facts of this case that
plaintiffs incurred attorneys' fees by ending up pursuing their
rights against the Dysons, the court cannot for the reasons stated allow attorneys' fees as an element of damage in their recovery against the Dysons.
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